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INTRODUCTION 
In January 2005, during an interview with The Washington Times regarding 
the war in Iraq and recent transformations within the Army, President Bush 
stated: “There’s no change of policy as far as I’m concerned. No women in 
combat.”1 Technically, the policy has not changed, but in reality, the nation’s 
policy has not survived contact with the enemy. As Commander-in-Chief, the 
President has engaged military power in the war against terrorism on a global 
scale, and the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have engulfed both men and 
women in combat. 
Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan) and IRAQI FREEDOM 
(Iraq) are the first major combat operations since hundreds of thousands of new 
positions in the military were opened to women in the 1990s. Women have 
deployed and fought as fighter, bomber, attack, and helicopter pilots in all the 
services, in ground combat support positions, and aboard combat and support 
Navy and Coast Guard vessels. According to the Department of Defense (DoD), 
in May 2006, 10,100 women were deployed to Iraq, and 1900 women were 
 
 1. Rowan Scarborough & Joseph Curl, Despite Pressure, Bush Pledges “No Women in Combat,” 
WASH. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2005, at A01. 
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deployed to Afghanistan, constituting eight percent of the total force.2 In total, 
over 155,000 women have served in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2002.3 
American women have fought and served in every U.S. war, beginning 
with the Revolutionary War. Today, there are over 198,000 women in the active 
duty military, constituting 14.5% of the active force.4 Women are integral 
members of the armed forces, serving as Airmen, Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines, 
and they are here to stay. Yet despite women’s accomplishments throughout 
history, and most recently in the War on Terror, DoD policy still prohibits 
women from serving in approximately 200,000 positions in the military.5 
In this Article, I will answer the following question: “Should women 
continue to be prohibited from serving in ‘ground combat’ units based only on 
their gender?” The answer I provide begins by placing today’s policy into 
context, summarizing the major laws and policies related to women in the 
military, and reviewing the history of the expanding roles of women in the 
military. I then analyze the ground combat exclusion policy and discuss some of 
the gender-related DoD policies that, in my opinion, hinder the full integration 
of women into the military as respected warriors. Finally, I provide some policy 
and legislative recommendations to further increase American military 
effectiveness. 
I had the privilege of being one of the first women to become a fighter pilot 
in the United States Air Force (USAF) and the first woman in U.S. history to fly a 
fighter aircraft into combat. In June 2006, I completed a tour as the first woman 
to command a combat aviation squadron, during which I led my A-10 fighter 
squadron into combat in Afghanistan in 2005.6 My assignment as a female front-
line warrior and the highest-ranking female combat pilot in the USAF enables 
me to view this issue from both an experiential and a leadership perspective. My 
 
 2. Joint Staff Information Paper on Women in Combat, May 3, 2006 [hereinafter Joint Staff 
Information Paper] (on file with author). 
 3. Sharon Cohen, Associated Press, Women Take on Major Battlefield Roles, WASH. POST (online 
ed.), Dec. 2, 2006, available at http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/02/ 
AR2006120200476.html. 
 4. Joint Staff Information Paper, supra note 2. The percent deployed to the combat zone is less 
than the percent in the total force primarily because of a high deployment rate of the types of 
positions closed to women, especially in the Army and Marines. This imbalance was also an issue in 
Operation DESERT STORM, where women made up eleven percent of the total force, but only seven 
percent of the deployed force. A Congressional Research Service (CRS) brief stated this was “because 
of the exclusion of women from specified combat units, and because services with a smaller 
percentage of women—the Marines, Navy, and Army—were overrepresented; and the service with 
the largest percentage of women—the Air Force—was underrepresented, compared to their overall 
percentage of the armed forces.” CRS, Issue Brief for Congress, Women in the Armed Forces (Dec. 
12, 1996), available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/92-008.htm. The CRS brief also stated, “since the 
main mission of the armed forces is to deter war by being prepared to wage one if it occurs, there is a 
limit to the extent to which the armed forces can increase the number and expand the assignments of 
women as long as there are restrictions on assigning women to combat posts.” Id. 
 5. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NAT’L SEC. & INT’L AFFAIRS DIV., GENDER ISSUES: INFORMATION 
ON DOD’S ASSIGNMENT POLICY AND DIRECT GROUND COMBAT DEFINITION 4 (1998) [hereinafter GAO, 
GENDER ISSUES], available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99007.pdf. 
 6. The A-10 is a single-seat attack aircraft that was designed to integrate with combat ground 
forces to kill the enemy in close combat, providing Close Air Support. It carries 1174 rounds of 
30mm bullets and a variety of other bombs, missiles, and rockets. 
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personal experiences as a combat pilot and military commander frame my 
analysis. 
I. CURRENT CONTEXT OF THE DEBATE ON WOMEN IN GROUND COMBAT 
DoD’s most recent version of the “ground combat exclusion policy” was 
established in 1994. The DoD policy states: 
Service members are eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they are 
qualified, except that women shall be excluded from assignment to units below 
the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the 
ground . . . .7 
The policy goes on to define “direct combat” as 
engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, 
while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical 
contact with hostile force’s personnel. Direct ground combat takes place well 
forward on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat 
them by fire, maneuver, and shock effect.8 
The policy then adds these additional restrictions: 
These policies and regulations may include the following restrictions on the 
assignment of women: 
• Where the Service Secretary attests that the costs of appropriate berthing and 
privacy arrangements are prohibitive; 
• Where units and positions are doctrinally required to physically collocate 
and remain with direct ground combat units that are closed to women; 
• Where units are engaged in long range reconnaissance operations and 
Special Operations Forces missions; and 
• Where job related physical requirements would necessarily exclude the vast 
majority of women service members.9 
This policy translates into the exclusion of women from infantry, tank 
(armor), and artillery units below the brigade level in the Army and Marine 
Corps, Navy submarines and other ships with close quarters, and Special Forces 
units in all the service branches.10 Additionally, as a matter of policy, women are 
excluded from serving in support units that collocate with any of these ground 
combat units. This particular restriction, referred to as the “collocation policy,” 
is one of the most contentious in the current War on Terror.11 
 
 7. Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, 
and Air Force et al., Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (Jan. 13, 1994) 
[hereinafter Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule]. See also generally Assignment of 
Army and Marine Corps Women Under the New Definition of Ground Combat: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Mil. Forces & Personnel of the H. Comm. on the Armed Servs., 103d Cong. (Oct. 6, 1994). 
 8. Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, supra note 7. 
 9. Id. 
 10. The Army is organized into units in the following order, from largest to smallest: army, 
corps, division, brigade, battalion, company, platoon, and squad. 
 11. For an extensive list of all jobs and units currently closed to women, see Appendix A. 
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In Spring 2005, Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-Cal.), then Chairman of the House 
Armed Services Committee (HASC), and Rep. John McHugh (R-N.Y.), then 
Chairman of the HASC Subcommittee on Military Personnel, introduced a no-
notice amendment to the 2006 Defense Authorization Bill that, if passed, would 
have codified a ground combat exclusion for the first time in U.S. history and 
prohibited women from serving in Army forward support companies. This 
move gained immediate public attention and provoked strong objections from 
Army leadership, DoD leadership, and many members of Congress. According 
to The Washington Post, Army Lt. Gen. James L. Campbell, Director of the Army 
Staff, quickly delivered a letter to ranking Democrat Rep. Ike Skelton (D-Mo.) 
stating that, if the amendment passed, “a total of 21,925 spaces currently open 
for assignment to female soldiers would be closed.”12 Retired General Gordon 
Sullivan, former Army Chief of Staff and President of the Association of the 
United States Army, also wrote a letter to the House Armed Services Committee 
stating that the amendment would be “confusing”13 and “detrimental to units.”14 
In the end, McHugh and Hunter’s efforts were thwarted; the final amendment 
was a significant compromise. It mandated that the DoD notify Congress of any 
opening or closing of positions or units under the ground combat exclusion 
policy that came into effect on October 1, 1994. However, it also mandated 
notification of any change that opened or closed any career fields related to 
military operations on the ground after May 18, 2005.15 This requirement was 
unprecedented because Congress had previously wanted notification only on 
changes to ground combat positions, and not on all career fields related to 
military operations on the ground (which includes essentially all Army and 
Marine positions). The amendment represented significant Congressional 
oversight of military personnel matters. 
The debate on whether women should serve in “ground combat” 
continues, and the issue will likely be revisited by Congress and the DoD. 
Policymakers should take into consideration the nature of current warfare, 
women’s performance in Iraq and Afghanistan, the transformation of the Army, 
and the challenges of recruiting in wartime for an all-volunteer force. 
A. Nature of Current Warfare 
In wars like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is no “forward area” on 
the battlefield. Today’s battlefield is non-linear and occurs in a 360-degree 
radius around the troops. Despite the ground combat exclusion policy, women 
are serving in real ground combat every day. They are vulnerable to being 
injured, killed, or captured; they are being shot at in ambushes and hit by 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs); they are employing their weapons and 
killing the enemy. Indeed, in the words of James Wise, Jr., and Scott Baron in the 
preface of their new book Women at War, “[t]he insurgency war in Iraq, which 
has no front lines, has made the debate regarding women in combat 
 
 12. Ann Scott Tyson, More Objections to Women in Combat Ban, WASH. POST, May 18, 2005, at A5. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, 119 Stat. 336 
(2006). 
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irrelevant.”16 Or as Lt. Dawn Halfaker, an Army military police officer who lost 
her right arm during a rocket-propelled grenade attack while on a 
reconnaissance mission in Iraq, put it: “Women in combat is not really an issue. 
It is happening. Everyone pretty much acknowledges there are no rear battle 
areas, no forward line of troops.”17 
Based on the current policy, women serve as gunners on truck convoys and 
as security forces or military police on patrol in the streets of Baghdad, but they 
cannot be assigned to multiple-launcher rocket system positions. They are vital 
to conducting searches at checkpoints in Iraq, a site of many insurgent attacks, 
since there would be strategic consequences if American men searched Iraqi 
women. Yet, they cannot serve in reconstruction efforts as combat engineers. 
Paradoxically, women fly Apache helicopters and kill the enemy while facing a 
high risk of being shot down, but they are prohibited from flying special-
operations helicopters. The policy excludes women from being in ground units 
that have an offensive capability, but they can be in units that can and do fight in 
a defensive posture. This is reminiscent of earlier restrictions for women pilots, 
who could fly helicopters, tankers, reconnaissance, and cargo aircraft into 
enemy territory at risk of being shot down, but could not fly aircraft that could 
shoot back. 
Trying to restrict women to defensive positions to avoid the risk of combat 
is ineffective in protecting women from the dangers of war.18 As of February 12, 
2007, seventy-five U.S. military women had been killed in action in Iraq and 
Afghanistan,19 and two had been captured as Prisoners of War (POWs).20 As of 
December 2, 2006, more than 430 women have been wounded in battle.21 The 
military is now training all troops in basic combat skills, since recent war 
 
 16. JAMES E. WISE, JR. & SCOTT BARON, WOMEN AT WAR ix (2006) (alteration added). 
 17. David Moniz, Female Amputees Make Clear That All Troops Are On Front Lines, USA TODAY, 
Apr. 28, 2005, at 1A. 
 18. Women constitute eight percent of the deployed force but only two percent of fatalities in 
recent years. Therefore, some argue, the direct ground combat exclusion is protecting women from 
the dangers of war. This argument is flawed for three reasons. First, the relationship between the 
combat exclusion and the number of female fatalities has yet to be fully analyzed. Second, implicit in 
this argument is the unprincipled assumption that a death toll of seventy-five women is acceptable 
but that a death toll of 300 would be unacceptable. And third, the combat exclusion may, in some 
circumstances, actually place women at increased risk. Consider the following example. On June 23, 
2005, a suicide car bomber struck a U.S. convoy in Falluja, Iraq, killing four marines, including three 
women. See Female Troops in Iraq Exposed to Combat, CNN.COM, June 28, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2005/WORLD/meast/06/25/women.combat. Another eleven women were injured. Id. It was the 
deadliest day for U.S. servicewomen since World War II. These women were on route to their posts 
at checkpoints where they performed the important—and culturally sensitive—task of searching 
female Iraqi civilians. Ironically, because current policy prohibits the collocation of women with 
small combat units, these women were transported dangerous distances instead of being collocated 
with the all-male units they support. I will discuss more fully American public opinion regarding 
women casualties in Part III.C, infra. 
 19. The World: Women in Combat (BBC News radio broadcast Feb. 12, 2007) (transcript and audio 
available at http://www.theworld.org/?q=node/7962). 
 20. The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Women Warriors (PBS television broadcast Apr. 17, 2003) 
(statement of Betty Ann Bowser) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/ 
military/jan-june03/women_4-17.html). 
 21. Cohen, supra note 3. 
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experiences indicate that anyone can find himself or herself in close combat, 
regardless of whether they are specifically assigned to “combat” or “combat 
support” units. Women are already in ground combat, and they are showing 
impressive results.22 
B. Women’s Performance in Iraq and Afghanistan 
Policy discussions must consider the performance of women in recent 
conflict. Women are displaying great courage and skill in ambushes, firefights, 
and battles on the ground. They are not just surviving, but earning medals for 
valor in combat. On March 20, 2005, Army Sgt. Leigh Ann Hester was in a 
convoy of twenty-six vehicles that came under enemy ambush by fifty 
insurgents.23 Sgt. Hester “led her team through the ‘kill zone’ and into a flanking 
position, where she assaulted a trench line with grenades and M203 grenade-
launcher rounds. Sgt. Hester killed at least three insurgents”24 and was awarded 
the Silver Star for her bravery under fire. In 2003, Army Airborne Capt. Kellie 
McCoy earned a Bronze Star with a combat “V” for Valor for her actions in 
Fallujah:25 “Leading a patrol that got ambushed and took casualties, she hopped 
up into the Humvee’s machine gun turret, killed a couple of the attackers, then 
led her men to safety.”26 As of December 18, 2006, the Army had awarded 
women warriors one Silver Star, seven Bronze Stars with Valor, thirteen Air 
Medals with Valor, and sixty-eight Army Commendation medals with Valor.27 
C. Army Transformation 
The discussion of the ground combat exclusion policy is complicated by a 
significant transformation in Army organization and warfighting concepts. The 
 
 22. Opponents of women in ground combat argue that sustaining and returning fire while in a 
defensive posture is normatively distinct from seeking out and killing the enemy while in an 
offensive posture. For example, when testifying before the 1992 Presidential Commission on the 
Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, Vietnam veteran retired Marine Sgt. Major Overstreet 
stated: 
“We say, ‘Combat is combat is combat.’ I’m here to tell you, it is not. First of all, I’m here 
to tell you that it is one thing to be in a combat area; it’s another thing to be in a combat 
area and have rounds coming in on you. It’s even another thing to send rounds 
downrange. But, it’s a little bit different when you know you are the guy that is going to 
have to seek out, close with, and do whatever it takes to the enemy. You. You are going to 
go out there and confront him, one on one. You realize that this is no game, there is no 
second place, and if you are second place, you don’t come back.” 
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF WOMEN IN THE ARMED FORCES, REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT: WOMEN IN COMBAT (1992) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT]. Ironically, 
the “enemy” to which Sgt. Major Overstreet referred included a significant number of Vietnamese 
women. See Appendix B. While the author appreciates the distinction between offensive and 
defensive posture, the author does not believe that traditional norms regarding the “proper” roles of 
men and women should inform military personnel assignments. 
 23. 151 CONG. REC. E1492 (daily ed. July 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Cooper). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Brad Knickerbocker, Do U.S. Women Belong in the Thick of the Fighting?, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, May 26, 2005, at 1. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Telephone Interview with Army G-1 staff (Dec. 18, 2006). 
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Army is now transforming to a modular organization of Brigade Combat Teams 
(BCTs) in an effort to become a lighter, leaner, more agile force.28 In this new 
organization, the current combat restrictions for women are harder to comply 
with without closing a significant number of positions now open to women. The 
Army is delicately dealing with this issue by assigning all forward support 
companies (FSCs) to the brigade level in the BCT construct in order to stay 
within the letter of the collocation policy. This Army decision motivated the 
2005 Hunter-McHugh Amendment, elicited criticism that the Army is 
circumventing the DoD policy and Congressional notification requirements, and 
sparked the recent debate on the ground combat exclusion policy.29 
D. Recruiting Challenges 
Finally, policy discussions concerning the ground combat exclusion for 
women must factor recruiting into the dialogue. Maintaining recruiting quality 
in the All-Volunteer Force during wartime has been a challenge for the Army in 
particular. New enlisted recruits take an Armed Forces Qualification Test 
(AFQT) which measures their overall aptitude. Recruits earn a percentile score 
of one to ninety-nine and are placed into one of six categories: I (scoring 93–99); 
II (65–92); IIIA (50–64); IIIB (31–49); IV (10–30); or V (1–9).30 Category V recruits 
are ineligible for service.31 Since 1991, the DoD capped Category IV recruits at 
two percent of the total.32 The DoD also desires that ninety percent of recruits 
have high school diplomas.33 Finally, although the DoD accepts recruits with 
criminal records, medical issues, or drug and alcohol problems via a waiver 
process, it desires to minimize these numbers. 
The Army’s recruiting difficulties can be seen in changes to these 
indicators. In 2004, ninety-two percent of Army recruits graduated from high 
 
 28. Under the old Army organization, the Division was the basic deployable warfighting unit. 
The new design has the Brigade as the basic warfighting unit. Therefore, a number of combat 
support functions that used to be at the division and brigade level are now assigned to the brigade 
and battalion level. FSCs are combat support units whose functions were previously attached to the 
brigade and division level and were open to women. The Army is attaching the FSCs to the brigade 
level (instead of battalion), thereby keeping the positions open to women, since the current combat 
exclusion policy restricts women from combat units or support units that collocate with combat 
units below the brigade level. 
 29. For example, Elaine Donnelly, President of the Center for Military Readiness, has accused 
the Army of circumventing DoD policy and Congressional notification requirements based on the 
FSC policy decision. See Elaine Donnelly, Center for Military Readiness, Questions About Pentagon 
Violations of Policy and Law (Mar. 1, 2006), http://cmrlink.org/WomenInCombat.asp?docID=262. 
 30. See Dep’t of Defense Instruction 1145.01, at § 4 (2005), available at http://www.dtic.mil/ 
whs/directives/corres/pdf/114501p.pdf; see also id. at encl. 1, ¶ E.1.1.1 (providing the numerical 
standards cited in text). 
 31. Id. at § 4.1. 
 32. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, POPULATION REPRESENTATION IN THE MILITARY SERVICES, at app. D Table 
D-7 (2003) (“NPS Active Component Enlisted Accessions by AFQT Category, FYs 1973–2003”), 
available at http://www.dod.mil/prhome/poprep2003/appendixd/d_07.html. 
 33. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Directorate for Manpower and Personnel (JCS/J1), Recruiting, 
Retention, and End Strength Report (Oct. 11, 2006) [hereinafter JCS/J1, Recruiting, Retention, and 
End Strength Report] (on file with author). The JCS/J1 produces this report weekly and monthly for 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
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school, 0.6% were in Category IV,34 and twelve percent required waivers for 
criminal offenses, drug or alcohol-related violations, or medical conditions.35 In 
2005, the Army fell short of its recruiting goals for the first time since 1979.36 In 
order to meet subsequent goals, the DoD raised the Category IV cap to four 
percent in 2005.37 In fiscal year 2006, the Army met its overall recruiting goal.38 
However, only 81.2% of Army recruits graduated from high school,39 3.7% were 
in Category IV,40 and seventeen percent required waivers.41 The Army has 
struggled to recruit adequate numbers of high-quality personnel, which will be 
more of a challenge if the Army end strength is increased by 65,000 troops, as 
requested by Secretary of Defense Gates in January 2007.42 These manpower 
challenges sparked recent proposals to reinstitute the draft. However, utilizing 
all volunteers, including both men and women, to maximize flexibility and 
capability should be considered prior to abandoning the All-Volunteer Force 
established thirty-four years ago. 
The realities of current combat, the performance of women in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Army transformation, and the challenges of meeting recruiting 
goals in an all-volunteer force provide the context for discussing and analyzing 
the ground combat exclusion policy. In order to fully analyze the current 
restrictions on women in combat, one must be familiar with how and why 
relevant law and policy evolved. Laws and policies on women in the military 
reflect issues of military readiness as well as a complex set of attitudes, 
emotions, culture, and politics about whether women “could” or “should” serve 
in certain roles. 
 
 34. Fred Kaplan, GI Schmo: How Low Can Army Recruiters Go?, SLATE (online), Jan. 9, 2006, 
http://www. slate.com/id/2133908/. 
 35. Anna Badkhen, Army Relaxes Its Standards to Fill Ranks: Critics Say Push to Meet Quotas May 
Let Unstable Recruits Join Up, S.F. CHRON. (online ed.), July 11, 2006, http://sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article. cgi?file=/c/a/2006/07/11/MNG03JT3ER1.DTL. 
 36. Associated Press, Lower Standards Help Army Meet Recruiting Goal, USA TODAY (online ed.), 
Oct. 9, 2006 [hereinafter Associated Press, Lower Standards], available at http://www.usatoday.com/ 
news/washington/2006-10-09-army-recruiting_x.htm?csp=34. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See JCS/J1, Recruiting, Retention, and End Strength Report, supra note 33. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Associated Press, Lower Standards, supra note 36. 
 42. Rowan Scarborough, Gates Requests 92,000 Increase in Active Forces, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 12, 
2007, at A06. 
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II. HISTORY OF U.S. LAW AND POLICY AND WOMEN’S ROLES IN THE MILITARY43 
During the Revolutionary War, American women served on the battlefield 
as cooks, nurses, water-bearers, laundresses, and spies. Margaret Corbin and 
Deborah Sampson were the most well-known women who fought in the 
Revolutionary War. Corbin took over her husband’s artillery position after he 
was killed in the battle of Fort Washington; she was later wounded herself. She 
was the first woman in America to receive a military pension for her service.44 
Sampson disguised herself as a man and served for three years, fighting in many 
battles before she was hospitalized and discovered to be a woman. She was 
quietly discharged. 
In the Civil War, many women fought on both sides by disguising 
themselves as men. Women also served in the traditional roles as nurses, cooks, 
and laundresses, and were used as spies, couriers, and saboteurs: “They blew up 
bridges, cut telegraph wires, burned arsenals and warehouses, and helped 
prisoners and slaves escape.”45 The most famous military servicewoman of the 
Civil War was Dr. Mary Walker, who is still the only woman to be awarded the 
nation’s highest military award, the Congressional Medal of Honor. Walker, a 
medical doctor with the Union Army, served in several major battles and was 
eventually captured and held as a POW. 
During the Spanish-American War, Congress authorized the contracting of 
female nurses to support the war due to typhoid fever epidemics among the 
troops and the shortage of medical personnel. Although these nurses were not 
given military status, over 1500 women served in the United States, overseas, 
and on hospital ships.46 Twenty women died while serving in the war, mostly of 
typhoid fever.47 As a result of the service of these women, Congress authorized a 
permanent Army Nurse Corps in 1901 and a Navy Nurse Corps in 1908. 
In World War I, nearly 23,000 women served as nurses at home and 
overseas.48 Women also served as yeomen and clerks on the home front, in 
addition to serving as contract telephone operators and stenographers in 
Europe. Thirty-four thousand women served in uniform by the end of the war,49 
and four hundred U.S. women died while serving their country—despite not yet 
 
 43. Unless otherwise cited, the information in this section was derived from Women in the 
Military: An Unfinished Revolution. JEANNE HOLM, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: AN UNFINISHED 
REVOLUTION (Presidio Press rev. ed. 1993). The data in this section was also validated by the 
President of Women In Military Service For America Memorial Foundation (WIMSA), Brig. Gen. 
(Ret.) Wilma Vaught. For an extensive history of women in the U.S. military through Desert Storm, 
see HOLM, supra, or visit the WIMSA Memorial in Arlington, Va. See also  WIMSA, About the History 
of Women Serving in America’s Defense, http://www.womensmemorial.org/H&C/History/ 
history.html (last visited May 9, 2007). 
 44. 14 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 805 (Worthington C. Ford et al. 
eds., G.P.O. reprints 1909–37) (1779). 
 45. HOLM, supra note 43, at 6. 
 46. WIMSA, Highlights in the History of Military Women, http://www.womensmemorial.org/ 
Education/timeline.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2007) [hereinafter WIMSA, Highlights]. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. (noting that 22,956 women nurses served, with 21,480 in the Army and 1476 in the Navy). 
 49. HOLM, supra note 43, at 10. 
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having obtained the right to vote:50 “Many Army nurses were decorated, 
including three who received the Distinguished Service Medal, a combat medal 
second to the Medal of Honor.”51 After the war, all women except nurses were 
discharged, and laws were passed to prevent their further enlistment.52 
Women’s roles in the military in World War II (WWII) were 
unprecedented, and their performance laid the foundation for the formal 
integration of women into the U.S. armed forces after the war. After the attack at 
Pearl Harbor, Congress established the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps 
(WAAC) and then the Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service 
(WAVES), a Navy auxiliary,53 but the law forbade women from serving 
overseas.54 In 1943, at Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Marshall’s urging, 
Congress passed a law upgrading the WAAC to the Women’s Army Corps 
(WAC), giving women in the Army a full military status, which included service 
overseas.55 Women also served in uniform as part of the Women’s Medical 
Specialist Corps (WMSC), Marine Corps Women’s Reserve, Coast Guard SPARs 
(from the motto Semper Paratus meaning always ready), and Women Air Force 
Service Pilots (WASPs).56 Over 400,000 women served in WWII57—eighty-five 
were POWs58 and more than 500 women lost their lives in service, sixteen of 
whom were killed in action.59 Although not trained to fight, be under fire, or be 
POWs, many women demonstrated courage in all theaters during this war. For 
example, six Army nurses were killed and four were awarded the Silver Star for 
extraordinary courage under fire following the bombing and strafing of the 
hospital tents during the battle at Anzio.60 
The U.S. struggled with the limits of women’s roles in WWII. The country 
trained the WASPs to fly all aircraft in the inventory as ferry pilots, to train male 
pilots, and to tow planes for anti-aircraft (AA) gunner training, but the U.S. 
would not allow women to fly in combat like Russian women did.61 After the 
 
 50. WIMSA, Highlights, supra note 46. Almost all of these deaths were from the flu, not combat 
action. Id. 
 51. HOLM, supra note 43, at 10. 
 52. Id. at 16–17. 
 53. Id. at 27. 
 54. D’Ann Campbell, Women in Combat: The World War Two Experience in the United States, Great 
Britain, Germany, and the Soviet Union, 57 J. MIL. HIST. 305 (1993). 
 55. Id. at 305. 
 56. WIMSA, Highlights, supra note 46. 
 57. Id. 
 58. E-mail from Marilla Cushman, Lt. Col., USA (Ret.), Director of Public Relations and 
Development, WIMSA, to author (Apr. 13, 2007) (on file with author).  
 59. WIMSA, Resources: Historical Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.womens 
memorial.org/?H&C?Resources/hfaq.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2007). 
 60. HOLM, supra note 43, at 92. 
 61. Holm notes that, overall, WASPs 
flew 60 million miles, ferried 12,650 aircraft, towed countless gunnery targets, and 
instructed hundreds of Air Force pilots. They flew as regularly and as long as male pilots 
in the same jobs and showed no difference in physical, mental, or physiological 
capabilities. Although thirty-eight lost their lives, the record shows that the women’s 
accident rate was about the same as the men’s. 
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British began to train and utilize women to operate AA guns, Gen. Marshall 
directed a secret experiment to see if American women could fill these positions. 
“The experiment stunned the general staff: the mixed gender units performed 
better than all-male units.”62 The Commander of the experimental units, Col. 
Timberlake and his superior, Maj. Gen. Lewis, were enthusiastic about the 
performance of the women and asked Gen. Marshall to allow them to replace 
“half of the 3630 men in his AA Defense Command with these more efficient 
soldiers.”63 Gen. Marshall deliberated with his staff and, based on his difficulty 
in obtaining approval from Congress to upgrade the WAAC to full military 
status, gave heavy consideration to the prevailing political climate. As a result, 
Marshall decided to terminate the experiment. “General Russell Reynolds, 
Director of the Military Personnel Division, summarized the Army Staff’s 
consensus to eliminate the anti-aircraft experiment before Congress got wind of 
it: ‘It is not believed that national policy or public opinion is yet ready to accept 
the use of women in field force units.’”64 
Almost all women were rapidly demobilized after WWII. However, the 
1948 Women’s Armed Services Integration Act65 formally integrated women into 
the peacetime military for the first time in history. The Act limited women’s 
service in uniform by capping the number of women allowed (two percent of 
the total force), the number of officers, and the permanent rank they could 
achieve (lieutenant colonel).66 The Act also prohibited women from serving on 
all Navy ships (except hospital and transport ships)67 or in “combat aircraft.”68 
The Act did not specifically prohibit women from serving in combat positions 
 
HOLM, supra note 43, at 314–15. For more information on Russian female combat pilots in WWII, see 
Appendix B. 
 62. Campbell, supra note 54, at 302. 
 63. Id. at 304. 
 64. Id. at 305. 
 65. Pub. L. No. 80-625, 62 Stat. 356 (1948). 
 66. HOLM, supra note 43, at 121. 
 67. The prohibition from serving on most Navy ships was not included in the original version 
of the law and was inserted at the whim of Rep. Vinson after an exchange between the Congressman 
and Navy officials during a hearing. Vinson stated: 
I am just throwing it out for what it is worth. Those are my views. I think it will strengthen 
the bill to have it positively understood by Congress that ships are not places to which 
these women are going to be detailed and nobody has any authority to detail them to 
serve on ships. Of course, they are not going to be detailed to serve on ships, but you 
cannot tell what happens. . . . [S]omebody might say they need a few of them up there to 
do communications or other kinds of work and I do not think a ship is a proper place for 
them to serve. Let them serve on shore in the continental United States and outside of the 
United States, but keep them off ships. Of course, they ought to be on hospital ships. I 
would not want to restrict (the prohibition) to combatant vessels. Put down “serve in sea 
duty.” You have auxiliary ships as well as combat ships. Just fix it so they cannot go to sea 
at all. 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Org. & Mobilization of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 80th Cong. 
5690, 5711 (1948) (statement of Rep. Vinson) (alteration added), quoted in Owens v. Brown, 455 F. 
Supp. 291, 306 n.53 (D.D.C. 1978). This prohibition—based on the feelings of one Congressman—
would stand as law for thirty years. 
 68. The services believed that any trained pilot had the potential to be a combat pilot and as a 
result, banned women from becoming pilots, despite the performance of the WASPs. HOLM, supra 
note 43, at 126. 
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on the ground, although that was clearly Congress’s intent: “Because the Army 
was unable to come up with an adequate, acceptable definition of combat, 
Congress elected to leave this matter to be sorted out by the Secretary of the 
Army so long as he clearly understood the intent of the Congress, which was no 
combat for women.”69 
Many women who served in WWII hoped that the 1948 Integration Act 
would serve as a springboard for increased integration and equality for women 
in the military in the future. Instead, women’s roles in the military in the 1950s 
and 1960s reflected women’s struggle to be accepted outside their traditional 
roles. Physical appearance became an important criterion for selection. Women 
were expected to uphold a feminine image, and women did not receive weapons 
training. At the start of the Korean conflict, 22,000 women were on active duty 
performing mostly administrative, medical, communications, or intelligence 
work.70 Some “[s]ervicewomen who had joined the Reserves following World 
War II [were] involuntarily recalled to active duty during the war.”71 However, 
unlike in WWII, the military decided to deploy only nurses to the war zone—on 
the ground, on hospital ships, and as flight nurses. Therefore, only “[a]bout 540 
women served in the combat zone,” while 120,000 women were in uniform 
during the Korean War era.72 
The same assumptions about women’s roles carried through the Vietnam 
War, where only approximately 7500 women (mostly nurses) deployed to 
Southeast Asia. Some women who served during WWII were frustrated by this 
policy. After she volunteered to deploy but was turned down, one Air Force 
Master Sergeant said, “I served in North Africa and Italy—I can sure as hell 
serve in Vietnam.”73 From March 1962 to March 1973, only one woman, a nurse, 
died from hostile fire in Vietnam, as a result of an enemy rocket attack in 1969.74 
Brig. Gen. Evelyn “Pat” Foote, U.S. Army (Ret.), conveyed her experiences: 
When I was in Vietnam in 1967, I was not weapons qualified. In fact, we were 
not allowed to carry weapons. I was up along the Cambodian border once with 
a field artillery battalion. The only thing I could do was run around carrying a 
purse—I called it my “M-16 purse.” I was wearing a baseball cap, no helmet, no 
flak jacket, no weapons, nothing. I was a liability to that unit. Women in the 
Army don’t want to be liabilities. They want to be assets, partners in defense 
with their male counterparts.75 
This sentiment is echoed by women in uniform today. 
The late 1960s and 1970s were characterized by changes in policy and law 
that incrementally opened many opportunities to women in uniform. In 1967, an 
amendment to the Women’s Armed Service Integration Act76 removed the cap 
 
 69. HOLM, supra note 43, at 119. 
 70. ROSEMARIE SKAINE, WOMEN AT WAR: GENDER ISSUES OF AMERICANS IN COMBAT 57 (1999). 
 71. WIMSA, Highlights, supra note 46 (alterations added). 
 72. SKAINE, supra note 70, at 57. 
 73. HOLM, supra note 43, at 210. 
 74. Her name was Sharon A. Lane, 1st Lt., U.S. Army. SKAINE, supra note 70, at 58. 
 75. Telephone Interview with Gen. Foote (Jan. 5, 2007). 
 76. Pub .L. No. 90-130, 81 Stat. 374 (1967). 
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on rank and total number of women allowed in uniform.77 By 1972, all Reserve 
Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) programs were opened to women, but 
scholarship opportunities were limited.78 In 1973, the military transitioned from 
being a mix of draftees and volunteers to an all-volunteer force.79 The Army and 
Navy opened flight training to women.80 In 1976, Congress passed a law which 
admitted women to all service academies, and the Air Force opened flight 
training to women for the first time in almost thirty years.81 Also in 1976, in 
Crawford v. Cushman, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
considered a challenge to the policy that discharged pregnant servicewomen 
from the military.82 The court ruled that the Marine Corps policy violated the 
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause since the policy was based on the 
impermissible assumption that pregnant women were permanently unfit for 
military duty.83 In 1977, the USAF began to train women as Titan missile 
crewmembers.84 The Army created a combat exclusion policy in 1977, as the 
WAC was about to be dissolved and women were further integrated into the 
Army mainstream. This policy stated that: “[w]omen may not serve in Infantry, 
Armor, Cannon Field Artillery, Combat Engineer, or Low Altitude Air Defense 
Artillery units of Battalion/Squadron size or smaller.”85 
In 1978, a Navy Interior Communications Electrician, Yona Brown, and 
other Navy women filed a class action law suit against the Secretary of Defense 
and the Secretary of the Navy challenging the law that banned women from 
serving on ships.86 Judge John Sirica ruled that the Navy could no longer use this 
statute as the sole basis for excluding women from serving aboard Navy ships.87 
In his words, the policy tended “to suggest a statutory purpose more related to 
the traditional way of thinking of women than to the demands of military 
preparedness.”88 This ruling prompted another amendment to the 1948 Armed 
 
 77. Combat Exclusion Laws for Women in the Military: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Mil. Personnel 
& Compensation of the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 100th Cong. 4 (1987) (statement of Martin M. 
Ferber, Nat’l Sec. & Int’l Affairs Div., Gen. Accounting Office) [hereinafter House, Combat Exclusion 
Laws], reprinted in GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMBAT EXCLUSION LAWS FOR WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 
(1987), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d39t12/134619.pdf. 
 78. WIMSA, Highlights, supra note 46. 
 79. Id. 
 80. HOLM, supra note 43, at 317, 319. 
 81. WIMSA, Highlights, supra note 46. 
 82. Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114 (1976). 
 83. Id. 
 84. HOLM, supra note 43, at 325. 
 85. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL (ARMY), WOMEN IN THE ARMY POLICY 
REVIEW 7 (1982) [hereinafter WITA POLICY REVIEW] (alteration added) (on file with author). 
 86. See 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (1988), repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 541(a), 107 Stat. 1659 (1993). 
 87. Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291, 306 (D.D.C. 1978). 
 88. Id. The opinion in this case provides the foundation for potential future arguments against 
women in additional combat roles. For instance, Judge Sirica stated: 
[B]ecause of section 6015, sex is required to take precedence over individual ability where 
the essential part of naval service is concerned. Significantly, none if the limitations and 
disadvantages facing Navy women is traceable to any studied evaluation made of male 
and female capabilities that reveals that women lack the native ability to perform 
competently in positions held exclusively by men. 
Id. at 295 (alteration added). 
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Services Integration Act,89 which opened permanent assignments for women on 
non-combat ships and temporary assignments (less than six months) on combat 
ships not expected to have a combat mission at the time.90 
In 1981, then-Army Chief of Staff General Edward Meyer directed the 
creation of a Women in the Army Policy Review Group (WITA), which was 
tasked to review issues regarding women in combat and to provide policy 
recommendations. WITA defined direct combat as 
engaging the enemy with individual or crew weapons while being exposed to 
direct enemy fire, a high probability of direct physical contact with the enemy’s 
personnel, and a substantial risk of capture. Direct combat takes place while 
closing with the enemy by fire, maneuver, and shock effect to destroy or capture 
him or while repelling his assault by fire, close combat, or counterattack.91 
Based on this definition, the Army reviewed all Army positions, missions, 
doctrine, and location and created the Army Direct Combat Probability Code 
(DCPC) system to identify the probability that each position would be in direct 
combat. All positions were assigned a code, P1 through P7, where P1 
represented the highest probability of engaging in direct combat and P7 the 
lowest. P1 positions would be off-limits for women. Based on this analysis, 
WITA concluded that twenty-three additional specialties must be closed to 
women.92 The DCPC is still used today as the means to identify which Army 
positions are closed to women. 
In 1988, the DoD created what is now known as the “risk rule” to further 
identify and narrow which traditional non-combat positions could be closed to 
women based on the mission and location of the job on the battlefield. The rule 
stated that the “risks of exposure to direct combat, hostile fire, or capture are 
proper criteria for closing non[-]combat positions or units to women, provided 
that . . . such risks are equal to or greater than experienced by combat units in 
the same theater of operations.”93 
These policy and legislative lines were not so cleanly drawn on the 
battlefield. Seven hundred seventy women deployed to Panama in 1989 in 
support of Operation JUST CAUSE, serving in various “combat support” 
positions as defined by the DoD at that time. These women included Army 
helicopter pilots who earned air medals for “combat missions” and the 
commander of a military police company. In 1990 and 1991, over forty thousand 
U.S. military women deployed for Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT 
STORM, constituting seven percent of the total force deployed. Two women in 
combat support jobs were captured as POWs and thirteen women were killed.94 
Women’s participation and performance in Panama and Iraq helped spark 
a new discussion on women in combat. “Defense Secretary Dick Cheney said on 
 
 89. Pub. L. No. 95-485, 92 Stat. 1611 (1978). 
 90. House, Combat Exclusion Laws, supra note 77, at 4 (statement of Martin M. Ferber, Nat’l Sec. & 
Int’l Affairs Div., Gen. Accounting Office). 
 91. WITA POLICY REVIEW, supra note 85, at 7. 
 92. Id. at. 8. 
 93. HOLM, supra note 43, at 433 (alteration added). 
 94. Id. at 455–61, 469. 
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2 March 1991, ‘Women have made a major contribution to this [war] effort. We 
could not have won without them.’ Commanders in the field echoed similar 
sentiments. According to the Coalition commander, Gen. H. Norman 
Schwarzkopf, American military women had performed ‘magnificently.’”95 
Congress almost immediately began to consider repeal of the forty-three year-
old combat exclusion laws. On December 5, 1991, the president signed the 1992 
Defense Authorization Act,96 which included a provision repealing the law that 
prohibited women from flying combat aircraft.97 Under the new system, the 
restriction on women flying combat aircraft was left to the DoD’s discretion. The 
new legislation also directed the creation of a Presidential Commission on the 
Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces to “study and make 
recommendations on a wide range of issues relating to service of women in the 
Armed Forces, with principle focus on combat roles.”98 
President George H. W. Bush created the Presidential Commission in April, 
1992, which released its report on November 15, 1992.99 In summary, the 
Commission recommended women continue to be excluded from ground 
combat and air combat (and those exclusions be codified in law), but 
recommended combat ships be opened to women.100 The Commission came 
under a great deal of criticism for being politically charged. According to Vice 
Adm. William P. Lawrence, U.S. Navy (Ret.), 
the White House disregarded the Secretary of Defense and Congress’s 
nominations of several distinguished individuals of recognized competence, 
experience, and objectivity. Instead, appointed among the 15 commissioners 
were five arch-conservatives, who from the beginning of deliberations appeared 
determined not only to prevent expansion of women’s roles in the military, but 
if possible to roll them back.101 
Upon the release of the Commission’s report, The Washington Post referred to the 
report as a “partisan mess,” opining: “A new administration, which will take up 
the question of women in combat along with other military issues, would do 
best to ignore most of the report and start again.”102 
The new Clinton administration did just that, and on April 28, 1993, 
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced his decision to open all combat 
aviation assignments to women. He also directed the Navy to open more ship 
assignments and types of ships to women within current law and directed the 
 
 95. Id. at 470 (alteration added). 
 96. Pub. L. No. 102-190, 105 Stat. 1290 (1991). 
 97. 10 U.S.C. § 8549 was rescinded entirely, and § 6015 was amended to remove the combat 
aviation prohibition. 
 98. William P. Lawrence, Commission on Women in Combat, 119 U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC. 48 (Feb. 
1993) [hereinafter Lawrence, Commission]. The requirement for the Commission was a tactic by 
conservatives in the Senate Armed Services Committee to table/stall a proposed amendment to 
open combat aviation to women. The amendment to repeal the combat aviation exclusion was re-
introduced on the floor of the Senate and approved, but the commission requirement remained in 
the language of the bill. HOLM, supra note 43, at 487–503. 
 99. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 22. 
 100. See generally id. 
 101. Lawrence, Commission, supra note 98, at 48. 
 102. Id. at 51. 
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Navy to draft a legislative proposal to repeal the law that prohibited women 
from serving on ships engaged in combat missions. The Secretary also directed 
the Army to study opening additional jobs including air defense artillery and 
field artillery. Exceptions to the policy would “include units engaged in direct 
combat on the ground, assignments where physical requirements are 
prohibitive, and assignments where the costs of appropriate berthing and 
privacy arrangements are prohibitive.”103 
On November 30, 1993, the President signed the 1994 Defense 
Authorization Act,104 which repealed the law105 prohibiting women from serving 
on combat ships. The new law also directed the Secretary of Defense to provide 
Congress with thirty-day notice when opening any additional assignments of 
women to “combat units, class of combat vessel, or type of combat platform.”106 
It also directed the Secretary of Defense to provide ninety-day notice to 
Congress on any changes to DoD’s ground combat exclusion policies, including 
a detailed description, justification, and implications of proposed changes on the 
constitutionality of the male-only draft. Upon the passing of this Act, the United 
States no longer had any law restricting women from serving in any positions or 
units in the military. All restrictions were (and continue to be) a matter of DoD 
policy, albeit with Congressional reporting mechanisms and oversight. 
On January 13, 1994, Secretary Aspin signed a policy memo to rescind the 
“risk rule” policy as a basis for barring assignment of women to some non-
combat positions. In its place, he established the current ground combat 
exclusion policy, which loosened the direct ground combat definition. 
According to the Government Accounting Office (GAO), “[i]n DoD’s view, the 
risk rule was no longer appropriate based on experiences in Operation DESERT 
STORM, where everyone in the theater of operation was at risk.”107 On July 28, 
1994, the newly appointed Secretary of Defense, William Perry, notified 
Congress that, as a result of the new ground combat exclusion policy and a 
thorough review of implementation by all services, 81,000 jobs previously closed 
to women would be opened by October 1, 1994.108 
According to the GAO, in 1998, approximately 221,000 positions out of 1.4 
million in the military were closed to women: 101,733 due to direct combat; 
89,755 due to the collocation rule; 25,663 due to living arrangements;109 and 3935 
 
 103. Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, 
and Air Force et al., Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (Jan. 13, 1994), reprinted 
in Assignment of Army and Marine Corps Women Under the New Definition of Ground Combat: Hearing 
Before Subcomm. on Mil. Forces & Personnel of the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 103d Cong. 88–89 (1994). 
 104. Pub. L. No. 103-160, 107 Stat. 1547 (1993). 
 105. 10 U.S.C. § 6015, repealed by Pub. L. 103-160, § 541(a), 107 Stat. 1659 (1993). 
 106. Assignment of Army and Marine Corps Women Under the New Definition of Ground Combat: 
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Mil. Forces & Personnel of the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 103d Cong. 87 
(1994) (reprinting excerpt from H.R. REP. NO. 103-357 (1993) (Conf. Rep.)). See also 10 U.S.C. 
§ 652(b)(1)–(2) (West Supp. 2007). 
 107. GAO, GENDER ISSUES, supra note 5, at 1. 
 108. Assignment of Army and Marine Corps Women Under the New Definition of Ground Combat: 
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Mil. Forces & Personnel of the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 103d Cong. 97–
98 (1994) (reprinting memorandum of William Perry, Secretary of Defense). 
 109. In this Article, the author is not analyzing the issue of excluding women from certain 
positions based on inadequate gender-separate living arrangements (like submarines), although it is 
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due to Special Operations status.110 The GAO report also stated that the 
approved direct combat definition “may not account for anticipated changes in 
military operations” because it links the definition to a position “well forward 
on the battlefield” in a linear battle.111 The report concluded: “Ground combat 
experts in the Army and Marine Corps note that, in the post-Cold war era, the 
non-linear battlefield is becoming more common. Should this trend continue, 
defining direct ground combat as occurring ‘well forward on the battlefield’ 
may become increasingly less descriptive of actual battlefield conditions.”112 Just 
a few years later, this prediction would become very apparent in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE GROUND COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY 
From Fort Washington in 1776 to Camp Victory in 2007, policy and law 
regarding women in combat roles shows a progressive march toward full 
integration based on capability, not gender. The nature of wars we fight today, 
as in Iraq and Afghanistan, has rendered untenable the DoD’s definition of 
“direct combat.” Nonetheless, the policy of exclusion remains. The common 
arguments against the exclusion revolve around this question: Why are women 
as an entire class restricted from assignment to ground combat units, support 
units that routinely collocate with them, and special operations units, even when 
many women are fully qualified and capable of service in these positions?113 
Some of the common arguments underpinning the combat exclusion are 
based on opinions as to whether women could serve in positions that are 
currently closed to them, while others deal with whether they should.114 These 
arguments are founded on the premise that women and men should not be 
treated as individuals, but rather as a class with generalized characteristics. The 
most typical arguments against women in ground combat are: (1) women lack 
the physical strength to be effective in ground combat; (2) women’s presence 
will decrease unit cohesion and therefore overall effectiveness; and (3) women 
just don’t belong in combat. 
 
her personal opinion that this should not be a reason to exclude all women from certain jobs. Of 
note, other nations have integrated women into these types of units. 
 110. GAO, GENDER ISSUES, supra note 5, at 5. The number of positions closed to women in 1998 
should approximate the number of positions closed to women today because there have been no 
significant changes to policy or end strength. See E-mail from Cynthia Bingham, Joint Personnel 
Readiness Planner, JCS/J1, to Col. Robert Labrutta, USAF (Dec. 2006) (explaining that JCS/J1 does 
not track the number of positions closed to women and that the number of positions closed today 
should approximate the number closed in 1998 because there have been no significant changes to 
policy or end strength) (on file with author). For a list of positions closed to women as of 2005, as 
reported by the Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), 
see Appendix A. 
 111. GAO, GENDER ISSUES, supra note 5, at 7. 
 112. Id. at 10 (alteration added). 
 113. From this point on, when I discuss the “ground combat exclusion policy,” I am including 
ground combat units, support units that collocate with them, and special operations units. 
 114. For examples of women in combat in other nations in the modern era, see Appendix B. 
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A. Physical Strength 
On average, men are stronger than women. As the 1992 Presidential 
Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces stated, 
[t]he evidence before the Commission clearly shows distinct physiological 
differences between men and women. Most women are shorter in stature, have 
less muscle mass, and weigh less than men. These physiological differences 
place women at a distinct disadvantage when performing tasks requiring a high 
level of muscular strength and aerobic capacity, such as hand-to-hand fighting, 
digging, carrying heavy loads, lifting, and other tasks central to ground 
combat.115 
The Commission then admitted that it also heard testimony from women with 
tremendous physical ability who desired to serve in ground combat.116 
Nonetheless, the Commission recommended excluding women from combat 
aircraft and ground combat, basing its recommendations partly on the issue of 
physical strength. 
Closer inspection of the argument from “physical strength” reveals two 
troubling double standards. First, as discussed more fully below, the argument 
that women should be excluded from combat because they do not possess the 
requisite physical strength is both over- and under-inclusive; many women have 
the physical strength to engage in ground combat while many men do not. 
Second, the Army does not submit male recruits to physical strength 
examinations before assigning them to ground combat positions.117 Male recruits 
are assigned to combat (or non-combat) positions based on a combination of 
aptitude scores, medical evaluations, and personal preferences.118 While each 
Army job is assigned a physical demands rating, the rating is used only to give 
recruits an idea of the rigors of the job.119 A male recruit’s physical strength is 
 
 115. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 22, at 24. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Interview with Army recruiters at recruiting station in Montgomery, Ala. (Mar. 29, 2007); 
Interview with Army Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) staff in Montgomery, Ala. (Mar. 
29, 2007). Each Army job, combat and non-combat, has specific entry requirements, outlined in 
Army Pamphlet 611-21. Dep’t of the Army, Pamphlet 611-21, Military Occupational Classification 
and Structure (Jan. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Army Pamphlet 611-21]. Army recruiters administer the 
AFQT aptitude test, see infra Part I.D, and MEPS personnel assign the recruit to a job based on his or 
her test results, medical evaluation, and personal preference. As in the Air Force, each Army recruit 
must pass a basic physical fitness test to enter the Army and a yearly physical fitness test. These tests 
are age- and gender-normed and are intended to ensure a minimum standard of health for all 
military personnel; the tests do not assess eligibility for specific positions. Yet the gender-norming of 
this test is cited as an example of a double standard by critics of women in the military, who 
apparently misunderstand (or misrepresent) the purpose of the test and conveniently omit the age-
norming when articulating their argument. See, e.g., Lee Bockhorn, Woman at Arms, 102 POL’Y REV. 
(Hoover Inst.) (Aug.–Sept. 2000) (reviewing STEPHANIE GUTMANN, THE KINDER, GENTLER MILITARY: 
CAN AMERICA'S GENDER-NEUTRAL FIGHTING FORCE STILL WIN WARS? (2000)), available at 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3487422.html. 
 118. Interview with Army MEPS staff, supra note 117. 
 119. Id. There are five physical demand categories: Light, Medium, Moderately Heavy, Heavy, 
and Very Heavy. Light demand is described as, “[l]ift on an occasional basis a maximum of 20 lbs 
with frequent or constant lifting of 10 pounds;” very heavy demand is described as, “lift on an 
occasional basis over 100 pounds with frequent or constant lifting in excess of 50 pounds.” See Army 
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tested only informally by whether he can complete the training required for the 
combat job.120 The double standard here is glaring: Male recruits are not 
disqualified from entering combat career fields for lack of physical strength, but 
all female recruits are peremptorily disqualified from such fields regardless of 
their physical strength. 
As a female who has both engaged in combat and led others into combat, it 
is my view that women should not be restricted, due to gender-based 
generalizations about physical strength, from any assignments for which they 
are physically qualified. My opinion is based on the following: 
1. Military effectiveness requires that we pick the best qualified person for the job, 
regardless of gender. 
While many men possess the physical strength and stamina to be in 
“ground combat” positions, many other men do not. Men should not be deemed 
qualified for physical demands of combat positions on the basis of their gender 
and women who possess the requisite physical strength and stamina should not 
be excluded from combat assignments on the basis of their gender. Instead, 
eligibility should turn on whether the recruit—male or female—meets the 
physical qualifications for the job. Again, physical qualification is currently 
based on whether the recruit can complete the initial training for the assigned 
specialty.121 
A gender-neutral policy will allow the most capable force to be assembled. 
All potential recruits should be screened as individuals, rather than by 
eliminating one group of potential recruits solely on the basis of a stereotype or 
generalization. Military effectiveness, and not gender, should be the sole criteria 
for assignment policies. 
2. This argument was used to keep women out of fighter aircraft in the early 
1990s and proved to be wrong. 
During the debate on whether women should or could be fighter pilots, 
many people used the “physical strength” argument to advocate the continued 
prohibition on women. Five members the Presidential Commission made this 
argument in the Alternative Views section of the Commission’s report.122 They 
 
Pamphlet 611-21, supra note 117, at ch. 9, ¶ 5.b. (alteration added). This categorization applies to all 
Army jobs, combat and non-combat. Some non-combat jobs that women can currently fill have 
physical demand ratings of Very Heavy—e.g., 45B—Small arms/Artillery Repairer—while other 
combat jobs closed to women have the lower rating of moderately heavy—e.g., 13M—Multiple 
Launch Rocket System Crewmember. See id. at ch. 10, ¶¶ 10-141, 10-55. 
 120. Interview with Army MEPS staff, supra note 117. Some Air Force combat jobs, such as 
pararescue and combat control, require a male recruit to pass a unique physical fitness test upon 
entry. See Air Force Instruction 36-2626, Airmen Retraining Program, attach. 11 (July 1 1999), available 
at http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/36/afi36-2626/afi36-2626.pdf. 
 121. According to Montgomery, Ala., Army MEPS staff, no male Army recruit is sent to a combat 
position against their will. If the combat exclusion were lifted, women (and men) who qualified for 
combat jobs will also have a choice to serve in non-combat positions for which they are qualified. See 
Interview with Army MEPS staff, supra note 117. 
 122. See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 22, at 43–79. The five Commissioners 
were Samuel Cockerham, Elaine Donnelly, Sarah White, Kate Walsh O’Beirne, and Ronald Ray. See 
id. 
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quoted many experienced male fighter pilots who discussed the physical 
strength and stamina required to be a combat fighter pilot and how women had 
yet to prove they were physically capable of the rigors of aerial combat. For 
example, when asked about women who were already flying F-18s in the Navy 
as test pilots and instructors, one Navy Top Gun instructor pilot stated: 
[Y]es, we do have women flying F-18s today, and that is a fact. They are 
currently not flying the F-18s that any of us have flown in the fleet or out in the 
combat missions. To compare the missions that they are doing today to what we 
are doing is like comparing driving the L.A. Freeway to driving the Indianapolis 
500. It’s just not the same.123 
The Commissioners with alternative views also quoted Lt. Gen. Buster 
Glossen, USAF, (who was responsible for air campaign strategy and execution 
in DESERT STORM) extensively on the stamina, which he defined as strength 
and endurance, needed to be a fighter pilot. He described the strength and 
endurance that fighter pilots need to sustain high G-forces without losing 
consciousness as well as to fly seven to nine hour grueling combat missions on a 
daily basis and said “the jury is still out” on whether women have the requisite 
stamina.124 
It does take a great deal of strength and endurance to be a fighter pilot. But 
notwithstanding the Commission’s and Glossen’s doubts, at least forty-nine 
women in the active-duty Air Force have completed fighter pilot training 
successfully and most, including the author, have flown long, demanding 
combat missions for Operations SOUTHERN WATCH, NORTHERN WATCH, 
DESERT FOX, ALLIED FORCE, ENDURING FREEDOM, or IRAQI FREEDOM. 
Air Force women fighter pilots have earned sixteen Distinguished Flying 
Crosses in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001.125 Critics who claimed that women 
do not have the strength and stamina to be fighter pilots in combat have been 
proven wrong by women’s actual performance. Some, like Elaine Donnelly, 
were eventually forced to concede that women fighter pilots “seem to be serving 
very well” and “appear to be competent and well qualified, and by all accounts 
are doing well.”126 Despite this positive experience with female fighter pilots, 
critics continue to use arguments based on physical strength and stamina as 
justifications for keeping the current combat exclusions in place. 
 
 123. Id. at 68. 
 124. Id. at 67. This issue has particular personal significance for the author. When combat 
aviation was opened to women in 1993, I was training to represent the USAF at the Hawaii Ironman 
World Triathlon Championship, a grueling athletic event consisting of a 2.4-mile swim, 112-mile 
bike ride, and 26.2-mile run. It is one of the ultimate physical tests of strength, endurance, and 
mental toughness. Each military service picked its best athletes for the competition. I easily won the 
women’s military division and beat all but just a handful of the men in all four branches of the 
service. Yet, some were still arguing that, as a class, women did not have the physical strength or 
endurance to be fighter pilots. 
 125. E-mail from United States Central Command Air Forces Director of Manpower and 
Personnel (CENTAF/A1) Colonel David Zeh to the author (Jan. 3, 2007) (on file with the author). 
 126. Lisa Hoffman, Women in the military no longer remarkable, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERV. 
(online ed.), Jan. 11, 2002, http://www.ctie.monash.edu.au/hargrave/further_reading_USA.html. 
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3. All relevant qualities should be considered. 
All personnel wearing the uniform must have some basic level of physical 
strength to ensure they can defend themselves in battle. However, a capable 
combat soldier must possess more than just physical strength. Skill, motivation, 
and a fighting spirit are just as crucial for the warrior, and all of these 
characteristics are gender-blind. Army and Marine leadership have recently 
been emphasizing additional crucial traits like judgment, discipline, restraint, 
and intellect, to name a few. Former Marine Corps Commandant General 
Charles Krulak has spoken and written about the “strategic corporal” who has 
to be ready to fight a three-block war. On any given day, in any contingency, 
that corporal may be dealing with hostile acts on one block, intervening to 
prevent conflict on another block, and providing humanitarian assistance on the 
third block: 
The inescapable lesson of Somalia and of other recent operations, whether 
humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping, or traditional warfighting, is that their 
outcome may hinge on the decisions made by small unit leaders, and by actions 
taken at the lowest level. The Corps is, by design, a relatively young force. 
Success or failure will rest, increasingly, with the rifleman and with his ability to 
make the right decision at the right time at the point of contact. . . . [T]oday’s 
Marines will often operate far “from the flagpole” without the direct 
supervision of senior leadership. . . . [T]hey will be asked to deal with a 
bewildering array of challenges and threats. In order to succeed under such 
demanding conditions, they will require unwavering maturity, judgment, and 
strength of character. Most importantly, these missions will require them to 
confidently make well-reasoned and independent decisions under extreme 
stress—decisions that will likely be subject to harsh scrutiny of both the media 
and the court of public opinion.127 
Warriors must be strong, but they must also possess these other vital 
qualities that are more likely to affect the strategic outcome. In 2005, the 
Secretary of Defense commissioned the RAND Corporation (a non-profit 
research group) to study various factors that determine military performance. 
The study primarily investigated experience, training, and aptitude. It is 
interesting to note that the RAND study did not even include physical strength 
as a relevant factor in measuring military aptitude.128 The study found 
overwhelming evidence that aptitude (as measured by AFQT scores) was a 
crucial factor in determining effectiveness in combat forces. For example, 
replacing a tank gunner who had a Category IV AFQT score with one who was 
Category IIIA129 improved the chances of hitting their targets by thirty-four 
percent.130 The Army almost doubled the number of Category IV recruits in 2006. 
Women recruits are generally brighter than their male counterparts and they 
 
 127. Charles C. Krulak, The Strategic Corporal, Leadership in the Three Block War, MARINES MAG., 
Jan. 1999, at 236–37 (emphasis in original; alterations added). 
 128. JENNIFER KAVANAGH, DETERMINANTS OF PRODUCTIVITY FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL: A REVIEW 
OF FINDINGS ON THE CONTRIBUTION OF EXPERIENCE, TRAINING, AND APTITUDE TO MILITARY 
PERFORMANCE 27 (2005). 
 129. For a description of aptitude scores and categories, see Part I.D, supra. 
 130. Kavanagh, supra note 128, at 27. 
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have fewer disciplinary problems.131 In order to get the best team of ground 
combat warriors based on physical strength and all other relevant qualifications, 
it is not logical to include marginally qualified CAT-IV males while excluding 
physically qualified CAT-I–III females. 
4. The author’s personal experience 
When Congress repealed the law that excluded women from flying in 
combat, I was in the middle of undergraduate pilot training. The Air Force had a 
merit-based rating system for men and women throughout the one-year 
program. All pilots received grades on every test, simulator, flying maneuver, 
and commander assessment. Prior to choosing assignments, pilots were ranked 
based on gender-blind performance. Based on my performance, I thought I was 
going to have the opportunity to become a fighter pilot. 
The massive military drawdown of 1990 and 1991 limited the availability of 
flying assignments, particularly fighter assignments. Consequently, upon 
graduation, approximately fifty-five percent of my class was assigned to non-
flying support jobs for three years. Only one pilot was assigned to a fighter 
aircraft. After three years, pilots who were delayed went on to train in a specific 
aircraft based on their performance, preference, and aircraft availability. I 
graduated fifth in my class and requested a delayed fighter assignment—an 
assignment that would have been available to me if I were a man. Because the 
DoD policy had not yet changed, my request was denied. I then chose an 
assignment as a T-37 Instructor Pilot in order to keep my options open for a 
future fighter assignment, if and when the policy changed. Males in my class 
who were ranked below me were able to choose delayed fighter assignments. 
As a T-37 Instructor Pilot, I witnessed several classes of pilots graduate 
with a woman ranked at or near the top of the class. Yet again, the lower-ranked 
male pilots went on to become fighter pilots, and the better performing females 
could not, solely on the basis of their gender. This type of exclusionary policy 
does not result in the most capable fighting force. 
After I became a fully qualified, combat-ready A-10 pilot, I discovered 
there was a policy that still limited me from fulfilling all the responsibilities of 
my job. Prior to 2005, all A-10 squadrons were responsible for providing 
battalion air liaison officers (BALOs) to specific Army ground combat battalions. 
BALOs are trained to provide advice and coordination on integration of air 
power for the battalion. They also control air strikes to support ground forces by 
talking to the pilots on the radio. These pilots train and deploy on the ground 
with their assigned units when called, and many A-10 pilots served in this 
capacity on the ground in DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM. In order to 
 
 131. Lawrence Korb stated, 
“In my view, women actually increase readiness, since they have more education and 
higher aptitudes than their male counterparts. But we hear a lot of anecdotes about 
women tending to be absent from duty for medical reasons more frequently than men. 
These anecdotes, though, overlook the fact that men are frequently absent for more 
‘traditional’ reasons—being drunk and disorderly, for example . . . .” 
SHEILA NATARAJ KIRBY & HARRY J. THIE, ENLISTED PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT: A HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 96–97 (RAND Corp. 1996) (quoting Lawrence Korb, Asst. Sec’y of Def. for Manpower, 
Reserve Affairs, & Logistics, 1981–85). 
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qualify as a BALO, a pilot has to attend a three-week training program, pass a 
physical-fitness test, and go through a local certification program, which 
includes controlling live air strikes. I earned distinguished graduate status at the 
school, aced the gender-blind physical fitness test, and became certified as a 
BALO. However, due to my gender and the collocation policy, I was prohibited 
from being assigned to an Army unit. 
Given my qualifications and skills, this policy made no sense as applied to 
me. I sent an initiative up the chain of command to ask for an exception to 
policy. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force approved and received agreement 
from the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs for 
me to deploy to an exercise as a “test case” BALO. On the eve of the exercise in 
1997, the initiative was postponed. The e-mail forwarded to me stated: “this 
initiative will happen,—probably sooner than later. But, as I [549 Combat 
Training Squadron Commander (549 CTS/CC)] told you [355 Operations Group 
Commander (355 OG/CC], I don’t think the timing is right.”132 The initiative 
never happened. In 2005, the Air Force decided that A-10 pilots would no longer 
have to serve in BALO positions. Instead, enlisted specialists who are not pilots 
would become BALOs. Women are still prohibited from serving in this role 
based on the collocation policy. 
B. Cohesion 
Those who advocate restricting women from “ground combat” dismiss the 
argument that combat effectiveness is enhanced by having all members of the 
force eligible for all positions. As stated in the Alternative Views section of the 
Presidential Commission report: “The key question in preparing to win and 
survive in combat is not what is best for the individual but what is best for the 
unit and the military as a whole. This is why the Commission spent considerable 
time seeking and evaluating testimony and studies on unit cohesion.”133 As a 
concept that relates to the quality of relations between individuals, as opposed 
to characteristics of an individual, cohesion is more difficult to measure 
empirically and is therefore less subject to objective assessment. 
Cohesion is a complex term that describes the unity and bonding that a unit 
must possess in order to be a team in battle. There are two general types of 
cohesion: social cohesion and task cohesion: 
Social Cohesion refers to the nature and quality of the emotional bonds of 
friendship, liking, caring, and closeness among group members. A group is 
socially cohesive to the extent that its members like each other, prefer to spend 
their social time together, enjoy each other’s company, and feel emotionally 
close to one another. 
 
 132. E-mail from 549 CTS/CC to 355 OG/CC (Jan. 16, 1997) (on file with the author). This e-mail 
was from the squadron commander responsible for coordinating the Air Force support to the Army 
exercise and was sent to the Operations Group Commander at Davis Monthan Air Force Base (my 
group commander). The e-mail explained that the exercise we picked for my test case deployment 
was high visibility for the Army to test future technology and tactics and not ideal for an experiment 
with female BALOs. 
 133. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 22, at 44. 
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Task Cohesion refers to the shared commitment among members to achieving a 
goal that requires the collective efforts of the group. A group with high task 
cohesion is composed of members who share a common goal and who are 
motivated to coordinate their efforts as a team to achieve their goal.134 
While focusing a great deal on cohesion as a reason to exclude women from 
combat, the 1992 Presidential Commission admitted that “[t]here are no 
authoritative military studies of mixed-gender ground combat cohesion, since 
available cohesion research has been conducted among male-only ground 
combat units.”135 To fill the void of data, they resorted to interviewing many men 
who never had women in their units—a rather biased sample—to get their opinions 
on how women would affect cohesion. Similar techniques were used in the past 
to keep African-Americans from serving in racially integrated units. For 
example, in 1925 the Army War College published a study claiming that close 
association of Blacks and Whites in military organizations was detrimental to 
harmony and efficiency and that Blacks were inherently more cowardly than 
Whites.136 Experience has long since shown these claims to be completely false. 
With military readiness at stake, we should not let prejudicial racist or sexist 
attitudes drive our policies. Women, by their presence alone, simply do not 
impede cohesion from happening for a variety of reasons: 
1. Military cohesion is based on people uniting for a common mission or purpose, 
not based on the group consisting of a common race, creed, or gender. 
Studies have also shown that it is task cohesion that is essential to getting 
the job done, though there is some debate whether task cohesion begets mission 
effectiveness or an effective mission begets task cohesion:137 “Task cohesion has a 
modest but reliable influence on performance; social cohesion does not have an 
independent effect after controlling for task cohesion. Under some conditions, 
high social cohesion is actually detrimental to unit performance; moderate social 
cohesion appears most beneficial.”138 
In 1997, RAND analysts Margaret Harrell and Laura Miller conducted a 
study on the expansion of women’s roles in the military following law and 
policy changes in the early 1990s and the effect on cohesion, readiness, and 
morale. The study focused on units that opened new positions to women after 
the 1993–94 policy changes. When asked to provide written comments about the 
factors that determined their unit’s level of cohesion, only ten out of 619 survey 
respondents even mentioned gender, despite the survey cover and introduction 
 
 134. Laura L. Miller & John Allen Williams, Do Military Policies on Gender and Sexuality Undermine 
Combat Effectiveness?, in SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS: THE CIVIL-MILITARY GAP AND AMERICAN 
NATIONAL SECURITY 361, 389 (Peter D. Feaver & Richard H. Kohn eds., 2001) (quoting Robert 
MacCoun, What is Known About Unit Cohesion and Military Performance, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND 
U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY: OPTIONS AND ASSESSMENT 291 (1993)). 
 135. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 22, at 25. 
 136. LT. COL. HENDERSON BAKER, II, WOMEN IN COMBAT: A CULTURE ISSUE? 6 (U.S. Army War 
Coll. 2006), available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil271.pdf. 
 137. David R. Segal & Meyer Kestnbaum, Professional Closure in the Military Labor Market: A 
Critique of Pure Cohesion, in THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY PROFESSION 441–58 (Don M. Snider & Gale L. 
Watkins eds., 2002). 
 138. Miller & Williams, supra note 134, at 54. 
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explaining that gender was an important component of the study.139 The RAND 
authors concluded that “[any] divisions caused by gender were minimal or 
invisible in units with high cohesion. Gender was reported as a secondary issue 
in units that had conflicting groups, and then it took a back seat to divisions 
along work groups or rank lines.”140 Some respondents stated that women 
increase unit cohesion: “Where people mentioned a positive effect of gender 
integration on cohesion, it was to comment that women’s presence had raised 
the professional standards of conduct in the military workplace.”141 
In 1999, the GAO conducted a report on perceptions of readiness in 
selected units. The report concluded: “Our survey on the perception of readiness 
of units opened to women since 1993 showed that both men and women had a 
positive view of their own readiness. Furthermore, most men and women 
agreed that women either affected readiness no differently from men or affected 
readiness positively or very positively.”142 The RAND and GAO studies provide 
strong evidence that the presence of women in these combat units either 
increased or did not decrease their task cohesion, casting strong doubts on the 
unsubstantiated claims of critics. 
2. Cohesion is a leadership issue. 
The Presidential Commission concluded that women’s presence might 
impede cohesion in ground combat units due to lack of ability to do the job, lack 
of privacy, traditional male views of women, sexual misconduct, and pregnancy. 
Cohesion between all males might also be impeded by a number of other 
elements—i.e., an individual’s lack of ability to do his job or carry his weight, 
selfishness, racist attitudes, lack of integrity, favoritism, or a variety of other 
dynamics that could degrade the team. However, none of these elements are 
inevitable and the right leadership climate can identify and eliminate the 
primary causes of degraded cohesion: double standards and behavior that 
“degrades the good order and discipline in the armed forces.”143 The reality is 
that there are challenges in bringing a group of any human beings—male or 
 
 139. MARGARET C. HARRELL & LAURA L. MILLER, NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR MILITARY WOMEN: 
EFFECTS UPON READINESS, COHESION AND MORALE 57 (1997). 
 140. RAND RESEARCH BRIEF, MILITARY READINESS: WOMEN ARE NOT A PROBLEM 3 (1997) 
(alteration added), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB7515/index1.html. It 
is interesting to note that Elaine Donnelly dismisses the RAND study as censored by the Pentagon. 
On her website for the Center for Military Readiness, she makes the following claims: the report was 
“revised and ‘cleansed’ of political incorrectness . . . unidentified spinmeisters exorcised sensitive 
passages . . . . Congress should investigate Pentagon censorship . . . .” Center for Military Readiness, 
CMR Analyzes 1997 Rand Study (Mar. 1, 2006) http://www.cmrlink.org/WomenInCombat.asp? 
docID=263 (last visited Mar. 2, 2007). 
 141. Harrell & Miller, supra note 139, at 66–67. 
 142. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GENDER ISSUES: PERCEPTIONS OF READINESS IN SELECTED UNITS 5 
(1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99120.pdf. 
 143. The next few paragraphs discuss all of the cohesion issues raised by the Commission except 
privacy issues and traditional male views of women. Privacy concerns can be ameliorated by 
providing some segregation in sleeping quarters or, if not practical in combat conditions, discretion 
and respect among professional adults as they focus on the mission, get rest, and attend to personal 
hygiene. Prejudiced attitudes toward women need to be identified, confronted, and altered, just as 
they were during racial integration of the military. 
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female—together to form a cohesive and effective team. Add in the stresses of 
combat training and life-threatening situations and the challenges increase. Unit 
leadership must create a climate where every person is respected as a team 
member with equal opportunity, responsibility and accountability. 
Double standards of performance should not be tolerated for any subset of 
service members.144 Some formal double standards that the author believes do 
degrade unit cohesion are: gender-segregated basic training, separate standards 
for men and women in basic training, lack of uniformity in military uniforms, 
policies that demean or degrade servicewomen, and women’s exemption from 
selective service registration. Additionally, poorly timed pregnancies can create 
the perception or reality of a double standard and decrease readiness and 
therefore cohesion and morale in a unit.145 All of these issues are discussed in 
greater detail in Part IV, infra. 
The remaining causes of decreased cohesion generally fall into the category 
of behavior that the military calls “prejudicial to good order and discipline.” 
This term is derived from Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ), which is used by commanders to punish a variety of offenses. Article 
134 provides: 
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to 
the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a 
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not 
capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken 
cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court martial, according to the 
nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that 
court.146 
Article 134 is a “catch all” article for behavior that is not listed in other UCMJ 
articles, but clearly degrades the team or discredits the military. 
Of all the possible behaviors that degrade the good order and discipline of 
the armed forces, sexual misconduct is an offense that might uniquely arise from 
gender integration. Sexual misconduct can come in the form of sexual assault as 
well as consensual sexual relationships that degrade good order and discipline. 
With regard to the latter, a gender-integrated unit might deal with three possible 
scenarios: (1) sexual relationships where one partner is married; (2) sexual 
relationships where one partner is superior in rank or position; and (3) sexual 
relationships between single service members of similar rank. 
If one member is married, this is considered adultery and is punishable 
under Article 134, UCMJ.147 If one member is a superior in rank, this behavior is 
prohibited by service regulations. Air Force Instruction 36-2909, Professional 
and Unprofessional Relationships, provides: 
Dating, courtship, and close friendships between men and women are subject to 
the same policy considerations as are other relationships. Like any personal 
 
 144. See infra Part IV.B. 
 145. See infra Part IV.A. 
 146. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000) (codifying Article 134, UCMJ). 
 147. Id. See also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, Pt. IV, Art. 134, ¶¶ 60–113 (2005) 
[hereinafter MCM], available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/mcm.pdf. 
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relationship, they become matters of official concern when they adversely affect 
morale, discipline, unit cohesion, respect for authority, or mission 
accomplishment. Members must recognize that these relationships can 
adversely affect morale and discipline, even when the members are not in the 
same chain of command or unit. The formation of such relationships between 
superiors and subordinates within the same chain of command or supervision is 
prohibited because such relationships invariably raise the perception of 
favoritism or misuse of position and erode morale, discipline and unit 
cohesion.148 
The final scenario is a sexual relationship between single service members 
of equal rank. Unit leadership must create a climate where individuals respect 
one another and understand that, unlike in the civilian context, their personal 
life choices can negatively impact the good order and discipline of a military 
unit. Commanders then must deal with each individual case, just as they must 
deal with a plethora of other personal choices that might negatively affect their 
team. Harrell and Miller discovered that gender issues were cited by fewer than 
one percent of their respondents when asked about issues that affect morale in 
recently gender-integrated units. However, they concluded that, “when they 
occur, dating and sexual relationships, even when not proscribed by the 
regulations, are often problematic within military units.”149 
AFI 36-2909 captures all unprofessional relationships that degrade good 
order and discipline—whether between individuals of the same gender or 
opposite sex. 
Relationships are unprofessional, whether pursued on or off-duty, when they 
detract from the authority of superiors or result in, or reasonably create the 
appearance of, favoritism, misuse of office or position, or the abandonment of 
organizational goals for personal interests.” Unprofessional relationships can 
exist between officers, between enlisted members, between officers and enlisted 
members, and between military personnel and civilian employees or contractor 
personnel. Fraternization is one form of unprofessional relationship and is 
punishable under Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).150 
Leadership is vital to ensuring that no relationships—sexual or nonsexual—
decrease good order and discipline and mission effectiveness. 
With regard to sexual assault, if the U.S. military has a sexual predator in 
the ranks, he or she should be identified, punished, and removed from the team. 
Restricting female soldiers from combat units will not protect all women in 
uniform from male sexual predators. Male sexual predators will come in contact 
with other women—combat support personnel, enemy, and innocent civilians—
who may be victimized. We have seen the strategic consequences of male 
soldiers raping innocent civilians. U.S.-Japanese relations were severely strained 
in 1995 after three Marines raped a twelve-year-old Okinawan girl. In December 
 
 148. Dep’t of the Air Force, Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-2909, Professional and Unprofessional 
Relationships (May 1, 1999) [hereinafter AFI 36-2909], available at http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/ 
pubfiles/af/36/afi36-2909/afi36-2909.pdf. 
 149. Harrell & Miller, supra note 139, at 83. 
 150. AFI 36-2909, supra note 148. See also 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000) (codifying Article 134, UCMJ); 
MCM, supra note 147, at Pt. IV, Art. 134, ¶ 83.b.(2), (4). 
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2006, the U.S. cancelled a joint military exercise with the Philippines, and anti-
U.S. sentiments were stirred, over the custody dispute of a Marine convicted of 
raping a Filipino woman.151 The military must proactively address the issue of 
sexual assault in mixed-gender units and swiftly remove and punish men and 
women who commit such crimes.152 Blame must be placed appropriately: The 
assaulter is the one who degraded cohesion of the team, not the victim. 
In sum, cohesion is a leadership issue, and leadership has the greatest effect 
on unit cohesion regardless of the gender composition of the team. It takes 
leadership to mold any group of disparate human beings into an effective 
combat unit focused on a mission where sacrifices must be made, trust must be 
built, and personal qualities of duty, responsibility, integrity, and discipline are 
essential. 
3. This argument was used to keep all women out of fighter aircraft in the early 
1990s and was proven wrong. 
The Presidential Commission heard testimony from many fighter pilots 
about how they were certain that the presence of women in fighter aviation 
would decrease cohesion and military effectiveness. The testimony of one Top 
Gun instructor pilot represents the opinions of twenty-one of the twenty-three 
pilots in his unit: 
[T]he lieutenants out there, and the captains in the Marine Corps are screaming 
that ‘No, we don’t want this to happen.’ And one big reason for it is that we 
need to have those units act as units. When you are out there in your fleet 
squadron, it is very important that you act as one, and you believe and share 
your experiences with each and every member, and you expect a lot out of that 
person, and you have to act as a unit. And if you can’t do that—and we don’t 
believe you can act as a unit unless you keep it the way it is, where it’s the 
bonding—it’s that intangible, the bonding that makes a squadron good, better, 
and we don’t believe you can have that go on if we have females in aviation.153 
Commissioner Elaine Donnelly summarized her views: “[M]ost combat aviators 
were opposed to the assignment of women to air combat units, primarily 
because of their concerns about the potential effects on unit cohesion which 
might decrease mission effectiveness and risk lives.”154 Despite such views, the 
record has since shown that women have successfully integrated into combat 
aviation units and flown as teams in combat. The predictions of dire 
consequences and mission ineffectiveness have not panned out. 
 
 151. Associated Press, War Games Canceled Over Rape Case, Dec. 22, 2006, available at 
http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,121145,00.html; Associated Press, U.S. Servicemen 
Convicted in Okinawa Rape, Mar. 7, 1996, available at http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9603/ 
okinawa_rape/. 
 152. Those found to have made false accusations of sexual assault must also be punished in 
order to ensure no degradation to unit cohesion and effectiveness. 
 153. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 22, at 71. 
 154. Id. at 101. 
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4. The author’s personal experience 
As the first woman assigned to my combat A-10 squadron in 1994, I 
realized there were some concerns about a woman’s integration into the unit. I 
knew that I needed to show my competency and capability. I performed very 
well in my combat-ready checkout program and won a squadron bombing 
competition despite being the least experienced pilot in the squadron. I earned 
respect as a fighter pilot, where performance is the ultimate, impersonal, 
gender-neutral standard. Within sixty days of my arrival in the squadron, we 
deployed to Kuwait for Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. Pilots were lodged in 
an area separate from the other troops. I worked with my commander to ensure 
I stayed in pilot lodging with my teammates. I lived in a trailer with four male 
pilots (in my own small room), and we shared a small bathroom with a shower. 
We maintained appropriate boundaries, exercised discretion, and fostered an 
atmosphere of respect for personal privacy. During that deployment, my unit 
became a cohesive team based on our combat mission focus, and my gender was 
simply not an issue. 
Years later, when I took over command of that same squadron, I led a 
united, capable, and cohesive warfighting team. This cohesion was strengthened 
as we deployed to combat in Afghanistan for five months. As a united team 
dedicated to the mission, my squadron was awarded the prestigious Air Force 
Association David C. Shilling Award for the best aerospace contribution to 
national defense in 2005. I have personally experienced combat cohesion that 
was race-, religion-, and gender-neutral. In my almost nineteen years in 
uniform, I have also witnessed units with very weak cohesion for a variety of 
reasons. Poor leadership and non-gender-related favoritism generally 
characterized the units I observed with the lowest morale and cohesion. 
Cohesion is a leadership issue, not a gender issue. 
So far, I have analyzed the issue of whether women could serve in ground 
combat, concluding that women should be assessed for assignment as 
individuals, not as a class. Some women are capable and some women are not, 
just as some men are capable and some men are not.155 Individuals should be 
evaluated for their capabilities, and leadership should set the conditions for 
cohesion between qualified individuals on the team. Leadership must also 
discipline or remove those whose behavior or attitudes, regardless of gender, 
detract from the team and decrease unit effectiveness. I now turn to the issue of 
whether women should serve in combat. 
 
 155. As a final data point, Canada removed all gender restrictions in its military in 1989. 
According to the Canadian Forces Desk Officer for Gender Integration, women now make up 3.8% 
of the ground combat arm officers and 1.4% of combat arms enlisted force. Women constitute nine 
percent of the deployed combat force in Afghanistan, including a female Master Corporal currently 
deployed as a rifle section second in command. Canada suffered its first female combat casualty in 
Afghanistan in 2006. The Captain was an armor officer. Canada has a gender-neutral performance 
standard for all of its positions. Total attrition rates for men and women in the last five years across 
the Canadian Forces were equal, at 6.2%. E-mail from Lt. Cmdr. Gord AuCoin, Canadian Forces 
Desk Officer for Gender Integration to author (Dec. 22, 2006) (on file with author). For other 
examples of women in combat in other countries and in history, see Appendix B. 
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C. Women Just Don’t “Belong” In Combat 
Some critics of women in combat center their arguments on personal beliefs 
regarding the “proper” roles of men and women. These critics argue that 
women must be givers and protectors of life—not takers of life—and that a 
man’s role is to protect and a woman’s role is to be protected. In the Presidential 
Commission’s Alternative Views section, Elaine Donnelly and others stated: 
“Good men respect and defend women. Women should not be required, as the 
price of equality, to sacrifice this fundamental principle that governs a civilized 
order.”156 The Presbyterian Church of America published a report in 2001 that 
used biblical references to conclude that all men have the God-directed duty to 
protect women (the “weaker” gender) and that women should not serve in 
combat.157 This report was signed by Bentley Rayburn, USAF (Ret.), in his 
capacity as a civilian; at the time, he was an active-duty general responsible for 
developing USAF senior leaders as the Air War College Commandant.158 
Indeed, until the early 1990s, the U.S. government attempted to shield 
women (at least formally) from the risks of direct combat. When the nature of 
modern warfare began to blur the line between combat and non-combat, the 
government accepted the notion of placing women at risk in a combat zone; 
however, policymakers continued to prohibit women from serving as offensive 
combatants. As a result, the status quo is an emotionally charged line: Women 
can serve in defensive positions and fight back when attacked, but they cannot 
serve in offensive positions where they are required to seek out and kill the 
enemy. 
Although attitudes regarding the “proper” role of women were overcome 
in the context of combat aviation, they continue to serve as the foundation for 
arguments by those who favor the ground combat exclusion policy. 
Additionally, these critics argue that America is not ready to handle seeing 
women in body bags or women as POWs.159 Are these accurate assessments of 
America’s views on women in combat? 
1. Polls 
Since the early 1990s, many credible national polls conducted on the subject 
has found that a majority of Americans support giving women the option to 
serve in direct ground combat. In January 1990, in the aftermath of the invasion 
of Panama, a CBS News/New York Times poll of 1557 American adults found that 
seventy-two percent of those surveyed thought that military women should be 
allowed to serve in combat units on a voluntary basis.160 In 1992, the Presidential 
Commission hired the Roper Organization to conduct two polls: (1) a random 
telephone survey of 1700 American adults; and (2) a written survey of 4422 
 
 156. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 22, at 61. 
 157. Ad Interim Study Committee on Women in the Military, General Assembly Actions and Position 
Papers of the Presbyterian Church in America, http://www.pcahistory.org/pca/1-278.html (last 
visited Nov. 29, 2006). 
 158. Id. 
 159. See, e.g., Kate O’Beirne, A New Horror of War, NAT’L REV., Apr. 21, 2003, at 24–26. 
 160. SKAINE, supra note 70, at 121. 
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active and reserve military personnel. The results of the Roper polls are 
reproduced in Table 1.161 
The Roper poll found that the American public was supportive of women 
in combat: forty-five percent of those surveyed thought that women should be 
allowed to serve in ground combat, and an additional twenty-five percent 
thought that women should be required to serve in ground combat.162 Both the 
public and the military generally supported women serving in combat, but the 
military was evenly split on the issue of women serving in ground combat. 
Additionally, seventy percent of the public and fifty-seven percent of the 
military thought that the effect of women in combat would be positive or 
neutral.163 
 
TABLE 1. 1992 ROPER POLL CONCERNING THE ASSIGNMENT OF WOMEN TO 
DIFFERENT TYPES OF COMBAT SITUATIONS 
TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT NOT ASSIGN VOLUNTARY REQUIRE 
Assign to Combat Ships?    
Public 17% 51% 29% 
Military 29% 39% 30% 
Assign to Combat Aircraft?    
Public 18% 53% 25% 
Military 30% 43% 25% 
Assign to Ground Combat?    
Public 27% 45% 25% 
Military 49% 30% 19% 
 
In 1997, TIME Magazine conducted a telephone poll and reported that “a 
majority of those polled, sixty-seven percent, supported the statement that 
women should be allowed to serve in combat roles.”164 The Triangle Institute for 
Security Studies conducted a 1998–99 Survey on the Military in the post-Cold 
War era. When asked if women should be allowed to serve in all combat jobs, 
fifty-three percent of 1001 people in the general public and 57.5% of 909 “civilian 
elites”165 answered “yes.”166 
Note that all of these polls were taken prior to women’s unprecedented 
contributions in ground combat in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and 
IRAQI FREEDOM. 
 
 161. Georgia C. Sadler, Women in Combat, The Polling Data, 119 U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC. 52 (Feb. 
1993). 
 162. Id. at 52. 
 163. Id. at 53. 
 164. SUSAN J. GOLDING, WOMEN: READY FOR THE CHALLENGES OF THE FUTURE U.S. ARMED FORCES 
7 (U.S. Army War College 2002), available at http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD= 
ADA401888&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. 
 165. “Civilian elites” were “selected primarily from directories such as Who’s Who, and include 
clergy, politicians, journalists, scholars, writers, labor leaders, and foreign policy professionals.” 
Miller & Williams, supra note 134, at 367. 
 166. Id. at 368. 
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2. Body bags 
Since 9/11, seventy-five women have died in Iraq and Afghanistan,167 an 
unprecedented number of female combatant casualties. The American public is 
showing distaste for the total number of deaths, including both men and 
women, but there has been relatively little outrage regarding the number of 
women casualties in particular. We are at war, and all of these losses are difficult 
to accept. But a woman’s life is no more valuable than the life of a man. 
Congresswoman Heather Wilson, the only female veteran in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, stated that the war in Iraq has settled the issue of whether the 
public will value the lives of fallen women soldiers over men. “There have been 
casualties, men and women, and we grieve for them. But I think we have gotten 
beyond the point where losing a daughter is somehow worse than losing a 
son.”168 
3. POWs 
Critics of women in combat state that Americans are not ready to deal with 
women POWs and all the risks that go along with being captured. However, 
during World War II, seventy-nine American military women were POWs in the 
Philippines, five women were POWs in Guam, and one was a POW in Europe.169 
Two female soldiers were taken prisoner in Operation DESERT STORM,170 and 
two additional female soldiers were held in the early days of Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM. Elaine Donnelly, a well-known activist against women in the 
military, has placed a great deal of emphasis on the risks of rape as a POW.171 
Although the risk exists for women, it also exists for men, and both accept that 
risk as a part of their job. In either case, rape is a violation of the Geneva 
Convention.172 
In the current war, male and female reporters, contractors, and civilians are 
also vulnerable to being kidnapped, tortured, raped, and executed. These are the 
horrors of war with an enemy whose strategy ignores these conventions. All 
men and women occupying military positions that render them more vulnerable 
to capture go through extensive training to prepare for this treacherous 
situation; each soldier must think through and accept the risks of experiencing 
 
 167. The World: Women in Combat, supra note 19. 
 168. David Moniz, Female Amputees Make Clear that All Troops are on Front Lines, USA TODAY, Apr. 
28, 2005, at 10A. 
 169. E-mail from Cushman, supra note 58. 
 170. WIMSA, Highlights, supra note 46. 
 171. See, e.g., Elaine Donnelly, Private Lynch and Amazon Myths, NAT’L REV. (online ed.), Nov. 14, 
2003, http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/donnelly200311140914.asp. 
 172. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 13–
14, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
Prisoners of war must at all times be treated humanely. Any unlawful act or omission by 
the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of 
war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present 
Convention . . . prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of 
violence . . . and against insults . . . . Prisoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to 
respect for their honour. Women shall be treated with all the regard due to their sex . . . . 
Id. 
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potential horrors as a POW.173 And although the public is rightly outraged when 
any of our service members are captured, the lack of outrage about female 
POWs in particular undercuts this reason for excluding women from combat. 
After analyzing the common arguments against women in combat, my 
conclusions are: (1) some women have the physical strength and stamina to fight 
in ground combat, and each recruit should be assessed individually; (2) 
women’s mere presence in a unit is not a detriment to cohesion; and (3) the U.S. 
public seems supportive of qualified women serving in any roles that such 
women are qualified to fill. However, there are some issues and policies related 
to women in the military that have and will continue to impede our combat 
effectiveness and must be addressed seriously in order to ensure success when 
fully integrating female warriors into the combat arms. 
IV. GENDER ISSUES AND POLICIES THAT DEGRADE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS 
Little public discussion has focused on the less glamorous gender-related 
policies that directly impact the essential element of success in the battlespace: 
combat effectiveness. These policies and the military ethos must be changed to 
fully integrate women into our warfighting force. In my view, many of the 
policies discussed below are “holdovers” from our past when women were 
restricted to more traditional cultural roles in society and the military. These 
policies seek paternalistically to preserve elements of femininity that reduce 
training effectiveness, set roadblocks to gender integration, and inculcate double 
standards. In the author’s opinion, the current ethos is partly a result of an 
overreaction to correcting real discrimination towards women in the past. For 
some of these issues, the pendulum needed to swing, but it has swung too far in 
the other direction and the results are destructive. The negative effects of these 
policies are used as fodder by critics of women’s integration into the military 
and are misconstrued as being caused by the mere presence of women. In 
reality, these policies promulgate actual or perceived double standards for and 
against women that ultimately degrade the warfighting team. As a female who 
has commanded a combat aviation squadron, I believe these policies and our 
ethos should be changed in order to increase the overall combat effectiveness of 
our armed forces. 
A. Pregnancy 
Once a reason for mandatory discharge, pregnancy is now considered a 
normal condition that is consistent with a military career. Current DoD policy 
allows a pregnant woman to request a release from her commitment to the 
 
 173. In the past, those personnel characterized as having a “high risk of capture”—i.e., fighter 
pilots, special operations personnel—were the only ones identified for the intensive training called 
survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE). The author has attended this training. Several 
“prisoners” in recent conflicts were not identified as being in positions that had a “high risk of 
capture,” and therefore had little to no SERE training—for example, Jessica Lynch’s unit. The 
military is still grappling with where to draw the line for SERE training eligibility in a 360-degree 
war. It is unclear at this point whether the fifteen British military hostages held in Iran in April 2007 
had any SERE-type training. 
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military, subject to approval by the service.174 Moreover, current DoD policy 
does not discourage pregnancy while in assignments that would remove the 
women from their primary duties for over a year (such as fighter pilot 
assignments) or pregnancy during periods of deployment vulnerability.175 
Consequently, a poorly-timed pregnancy in today’s high tempo military176—
consisting of over fourteen percent women—can have a significant effect on 
military effectiveness.177 Harrell and Miller discovered this during their study on 
women’s effect on readiness. 
We heard many times that who was pregnant and when she was pregnant made 
a tremendous difference to unit readiness. There was a general perception that 
women officers and senior enlisted personnel try to time their pregnancies to 
have the least effect upon the unit—e.g., not before a scheduled deployment. 
This was due, in part, to their pride in and concern regarding their units and 
also because, we were told, these women had invested a lot of time in their 
careers and would not want to damage them. These opinions stood in marked 
contrast to those concerning junior female personnel, especially single mothers. 
Single, pregnant, junior enlisted personnel were considered the most 
problematic because the pregnancies were less likely to be planned and more 
likely to create other problems, such as financial and child-care problems, that 
impacted the unit.178 
The military is unlike any other organization: Its purpose is the defense of 
the nation. The military must foster a culture in which military women 
understand that it is not appropriate to get pregnant whenever they desire. 
Instead, women need to realize their duties take precedence. They must take 
measures to prevent unplanned pregnancies and plan for pregnancies to occur 
only when they are in non-deployable situations. Expansion of women’s roles in 
uniform, the shrinking of the force, and the high operations tempo, where every 
military position is vulnerable to deploy, has made this even more crucial than 
in the past. Military leaders must create a climate where commanders are not 
afraid to talk about pregnancy as a readiness issue and to counsel female 
 
 174. The military services can deny the request due to needs of the military; however, the author 
is aware of requests approved by the Air Force. 
 175. The USAF assigns every position to an Air Expeditionary Force—a cycle of four months 
deployment vulnerability followed by fifteen months recovery, routine training, and preparation for 
the next deployment. Many high-demand specialties are on a higher tempo, but all the services are 
attempting to tell servicemen and women when they are scheduled to deploy next, barring 
unforeseen circumstances. 
 176. By high tempo, the author means high deployment rate, duration, and frequency. Every 
person in every unit matters to meet the mission demands, and having even a small percentage 
unable to deploy at any time can place significant strains upon the unit, including the personnel who 
must replace those unable to deploy. 
 177. DoD policy prohibits pregnant women from deploying overseas or participating in activities 
that would potentially be dangerous to the baby. Navy and Marine Corps policies state that 
pregnant women must be within six hours of a hospital. Harrell & Miller, supra note 139, at 39. For a 
fighter pilot flying in an ejection seat aircraft, a pregnant pilot is grounded immediately and unable 
to do her primary job for almost a full year. After not flying for at least ten months, a pilot must go 
through a formal requalification training program in order to become combat ready. While 
grounded, the overall combat readiness of the squadron is diminished. 
 178. Id. at 40–41. 
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warriors on their obligation to avoid pregnancies when it will negatively impact 
unit readiness.179 The issue is intent, which is difficult to enforce except through 
strong leadership, a call to dedication and integrity, and proper counseling for 
military women. 
While pregnancy is a temporary condition, parenthood is a permanent one 
that affects both servicemen and servicewomen. Single parents and dual-
military parents are obligated to have a plan for care of their children in event of 
deployment and many manage their duties and parenthood admirably. 
Servicewomen should not be allowed to avoid their service obligations merely 
because they become pregnant.180 
B. Double Standards 
Another dynamic that may decrease cohesion in gender-integrated units is 
the appearance or reality of a double standard. If the military is truly to be a 
warfighting team with gender-neutral standards, it must abolish all policies that 
appear to make things easier or different for women, including those that 
demean them. Harrell and Miller found that some “[l]eaders create resentment 
between men and women by holding them to different standards or giving them 
assignments or recognition based on gender.”181 Although gender was not cited 
as a major factor in determining the morale of gender-integrated units, “[t]o the 
extent that gender affected morale, the perception of different standards or 
policies for men and women was a frequently cited source of morale 
problems.”182 It is my view that these perceptions are born during the first phase 
of transition into military life, basic training, and are reinforced by other policies 
throughout service members’ careers. 
1. Basic Training 
When I entered the Air Force Academy, we went through gender-
integrated basic training. It was challenging for all, but women simply needed to 
be in much better shape for their gender than men. As a senior, I was in charge 
of the hardest course in basic training, the Assault Course. We taught basic 
warfighting skills and it was physically exhausting for both men and women. It 
is my judgment that gender-segregated basic training is not conducive to 
building an effective warfighting team and only plants the seed that women are 
inferior partners in uniform. Watered down gender-integrated training that 
caters to weak women diminishes the training experience for all. The military 
needs gender-integrated basic training that demands women recruits perform to 
a very high standard of fitness in which both men and women are challenged. 
 
 179. The author realizes accidents may happen, and units should deal with them just like 
unplanned injuries and illnesses. There is a fine line between creating an ethos that addresses this 
issue seriously and not encouraging women to have abortions or endanger the health of their babies 
for fear of potential career implications. 
 180. It is the author’s recommendation that young service women, especially, need to be 
counseled about the foolishness of entering into a lifetime commitment (motherhood) in order to be 
released early from a four or six year commitment to serve in the military. 
 181. HARRELL & MILLER, supra note 139, at 63 (alteration added). 
 182. Id. at 80 (alteration added). 
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When men enter basic training, the military shaves their heads. This policy 
is intended to take away the person’s individuality and build him into a warrior 
who is a part of a team greater than himself. The head-shaving procedure is a 
significant event on the first day of a young man’s transition into the military. 
When women enter basic training (for the Air Force), their hair is not cut. 
Women are directed to style their hair in accordance with policies on personal 
appearance as they watch their male teammates get their heads shaved. This sets 
the tone for a double standard that impacts the way men and women treat each 
other for the rest of their time in service. 
Assuming the head-shaving ritual is beneficial for the transformation from 
civilian to warrior, this policy does not allow women to experience that same 
significant, symbolic event on their journey to becoming warriors. This double 
standard is indefensible and needs to be changed.183 The issue was seriously (and 
emotionally) debated upon admitting the first women to the Virginia Military 
Institute. The final decision was that women got a “short-sheared cut” of 
approximately one-inch long for the first six weeks of basic training and then are 
able to grow it out to a short style for the remaining six months of the first year. 
After that, they, like the male cadets, can grow it out further as long as they 
remain within regulations. This would be a reasonable alternative to the current 
Air Force policy.184 
2. Uniforms 
When women served in WWII, they initially wore the same uniform as 
men, which caused functional and practical obstacles for some women. Over 
time, the women’s uniform was modified substantially. In the 1950s and 1960s, a 
great deal of emphasis was placed on ensuring that women looked “feminine,” 
even under grueling conditions in the combat zone.185 These attitudes impact the 
uniform women wear today. 
Currently in the Air Force, other than the battle dress uniform and flight 
suit, women’s uniforms have an entirely different look than men’s.186 Women are 
allowed to wear skirts, pumps, and pantyhose when in their “blues.”187 Women 
have a light blue shirt that is allowed to be untucked from their blue pants. 188 
Women must wear a long skirt and heels when in formal dress uniform.189 The 
differences have become ridiculous at times: Until one year ago, women’s 
cummerbunds on their formal uniform were worn with the pleats down, while 
 
 183. LAURA FAIRCHILD BRODIE, VMI, AND THE COMING OF WOMEN 131 (N.Y., Pantheon Books 
2000). 
 184. The author did not research the basic training policies of the other services. If they also 
allow women to keep their hair long, their policies should likewise be modified to eliminate the 
double standard and its effects. 
 185. HOLM, supra note 43, at 181–82. 
 186. See generally Dep’t of the Air Force, Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-2903, Dress and Personal 
Appearance of Air Force Personnel (Aug. 2, 2006), http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/36/ 
afi36-2903/afi36-2903.pdf [hereinafter AFI 36-2903]. 
 187. Id. at 68–71. 
 188. Id. at 64. 
 189. Id. at 67–68. 
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men’s are directed to be worn with pleats up.190 Women have a different flight 
cap than men.191 And women’s belts face the opposite direction of men’s belts.192 
Most police and fire departments have gender-neutral uniform styles.193 The 
need for different sizes and cuts in order to better fit a woman’s body and look 
professional is understandable, but any other differences in uniforms only 
accentuates our differences. It is called a “uniform” for a reason: it makes 
everyone look the same. While women do not have to be masculine to serve in 
the military, when your line of work is the defense of the nation, there is no 
place for high heels, pantyhose, and skirts above the knee. 
3. Double standards that demean or patronize female warriors 
If we are to treat all military members equally, the DoD must ensure that it 
also eliminates double standards that are demeaning or patronizing to women. 
This includes different standards based on the excuse of adhering to “cultural 
norms” or “host nation sensitivities.” I spent over seven years of my career 
trying to eliminate the policy that required non-Muslim U.S. servicewomen to 
wear the traditional Muslim abaya (burqa) in Saudi Arabia. This policy, along 
with others that treated military women as second-class citizens, degraded the 
good order and discipline of the military by creating a double standard that was 
demeaning to women. It affected the way military men treated and viewed 
military women. In the end, after the Department of Defense refused to rescind 
the policy, Congress unanimously passed an amendment to the 2003 Defense 
Authorization Act that overturned the policy.194 Other policies that demean or 
patronize female warriors should be identified and eliminated. 
4. Selective Service registration 
Since the birth of our republic, citizenship has entailed certain rights and 
obligations. At times these obligations include military service.195 It is the public 
 
 190. Uniform Board Results Released, AIR FORCE LINK (online), Feb. 8, 2006, http://www.af.mil/ 
news/story.asp?id=123016142. 
 191. AFI 36-2903, supra note 186, at 32. As of 2006, women are now authorized to wear the more 
traditional “male” flight cap on an optional basis, due in part to efforts by the author. See Uniform 
Board Results Released, supra note 190. 
 192. AFI 36-2903, supra note 186, at 51, 68. 
 193. See, e.g., Iowa City Police, Personal Appearance and Uniform Regulations (May 23, 1994), 
http://www.icgov.org/policefiles/genorder4.pdf; Red Oaks, Tex., Fire Department, Dress and 
Appearance Code, http://www.redoaktx.org/departments/fire-rescue/sop-sogs/general-guide 
lines/2006/10/39 (last visited Apr. 2, 2007). 
 194. See Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-314, 
§ 563, 116 Stat. 2458 (2002). See also Amended Complaint for Deprivation of Constitutional and 
Statutory Rights at ¶¶ 13–20, McSally v. Rumsfeld, No. CV-02481 (D.D.C. May 3, 2002), available at 
http://www.neubergerlaw.com/McSally%20Amended%20Complaint.PDF, dismissed with prejudice 
per stipulation of the parties, No. CV-02481 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2004) (unpublished disposition), cited in 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16, McSally v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-40 (U.S. July 1, 2005) (presenting the 
procedural question of an award of attorneys’ fees; conceding that the underlying substantive 
question was mooted by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 
107-314, § 563), available at 2005 WL 1596607. 
 195. The connection between citizenship and service was a primary argument for the abolition of 
slavery after the Civil War, where advocates claimed that Black Americans had “bought their rights 
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policy of our republic that the obligation of military be shared generally. Section 
451 of the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) of 1948 provides: 
The Congress declares that an adequate armed strength must be achieved and 
maintained to insure [sic] the security of this nation. Congress further declares 
that in a free society the obligations and privileges of serving in the armed forces and the 
reserve components thereof should be shared generally, in accordance with a system of 
selection which is fair and just, and which is consistent with the maintenance of an 
effective national economy.196 
Section 453 of the MSSA empowers the President, by proclamation, to require 
the registration of “every male citizen” and resident alien between the ages of 
eighteen and twenty-six.197 
In Rostker v. Goldberg, the Supreme Court considered whether male-only 
registration under the MSSA violated the equal protection component of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.198 The Court upheld the male-only 
registration policy, expressing the need for “healthy deference to legislative and 
executive judgments in the area of military affairs.”199 The Court side-stepped a 
full equal protection analysis of the male-only draft restriction, reasoning that 
because women were not eligible to serve in combat, men and women were not 
similarly situated for the purposes of the registration exemption: 
The existence of combat restrictions clearly indicates the basis for Congress’ 
decision to exempt women from registration. The purpose of registration was to 
prepare for a draft of combat troops. Since women are excluded from combat, 
Congress concluded that they would not be needed in the event of a draft, and 
therefore decided not to register them.200 
The Rostker decision begs the question: If direct ground combat is opened 
to women, and if the Fifth Amendment requires that both men and women 
comply with selective service obligations, should women be compelled to serve 
in direct ground combat if drafted? In my view, men and women should serve 
in the positions for which they are best qualified, in light of their physical 
capabilities and other objective measures. Citizens’ rights and responsibilities 
should be gender-neutral.201 Some argue that droves of women will get pregnant 
to avoid the possibility of serving in combat. However, the reality is that men 
 
with blood.” LORY M. FENNER & MARIE E. DE YOUNG, WOMEN IN COMBAT: CIVIC DUTY OR MILITARY 
LIABILITY? 54 (Georgetown Univ. Press 2001). 
 196. Military Selective Service Act of 1948, § 451, 62 Stat. 604 (80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1948) 
(emphasis added). 
 197. Id. at § 453. 
 198. 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
 199. Id. at 66. 
 200. Id. at 70, 77 (emphasis added). 
 201. For a detailed analysis of the issue of the draft as an obligation of citizenship for men and 
women, see FENNER & DE YOUNG, supra note 195. I realize that I am in the minority in stating that 
qualified women might be forced into ground combat in the future as an implication of the policy 
change. When 906 civilian elite and 710 military elite were asked if women should be required to 
serve in all combat jobs, only 13.9% of the civilians and 12.7% of the military answered “yes.” Miller 
& Williams, supra note 134, at 369. 
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who are unwilling to fight may also find ways to avoid their service obligations, 
and we should deal with both of these issues during the execution phase. 
Adjustments to the military ethos regarding pregnancy and double 
standards will enhance current and future integration of women warriors into 
the military warfighting team. This climate change, along with the policy and 
legislative recommendations articulated below, will fully integrate women in a 
manner that maximizes combat effectiveness. 
V. POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS 
Just as Operation DESERT STORM provided the justification to eliminate 
many restrictions on women’s roles in the military, Operations IRAQI 
FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM illustrate the obsolescence of the 
ground combat exclusion and should serve as the justification to further expand 
women’s roles in the military. As women’s roles expand, the military must 
ensure maximum effectiveness of its fighting force. This can be done by 
evaluating recruits as individuals, creating a leadership climate that maximizes 
unit cohesion, and adjusting our ethos to eliminate double-standards and other 
hold-over gender policies and attitudes from the past. I recommend the 
following policy and law changes: 
A. Rescind the Collocation Policy 
The collocation policy was intended to minimize the risk of combat to 
women in combat support positions, but the realities of modern warfare have 
made this restriction obsolete. All combat support personnel are vulnerable to 
the risks of combat and are now being trained to ensure readiness for combat 
operations. In practice, the collocation policy merely restricts assignment 
flexibility during a time of strained personnel tempo. The DoD should 
immediately notify Congress that it is rescinding the collocation rule, in order to 
align current policy with the realities of combat today and to provide 
assignment flexibility to combat commanders. This would open over eighty 
thousand combat support positions to women.202 
B. Adopt Gender-Neutral Criteria for Assignments 
The military services should adopt a gender-neutral meritocratic approach 
for assigning enlistees to specific positions. Potential servicemen and women 
should be considered as individuals, not as members of a particular race, 
religion, or gender. A gender-neutral, capabilities-based assignment system 
would provide maximum flexibility for military leadership during the planning 
and execution of combat operations. 
This approach is similar to that articulated by the Honorable Edwin Dorn, 
Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, when he testified 
before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Military Forces 
and Personnel in 1994. Undersecretary Dorn stated: 
 
 202. GAO, GENDER ISSUES, supra note 5, at 5. 
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Readiness is enhanced when we remove unnecessary impediments to the 
recruitment, training, and use of people. During the past year-and-a-half, the 
Department has made major progress in removing such impediments. As a 
result, some 260,000 more jobs in the military can be filled by either men or 
women. This represents an increase in the flexibility that the Services need to 
maintain readiness. Altogether, about 80% of all jobs in the armed services and 
more than 90% of military career fields can now be filled by the best qualified 
and available person, man or woman.203 
This logic should extend to the remaining career fields and positions. If the 
goal is to field the most capable fighting force, a policy that excludes fifty-one percent of 
the population from twenty percent of military positions is neither efficient nor wise. 
America must pick the best “man” for every military job—even if she is a woman. 
C. Rescind the Ground Combat Exclusion Policy 
The DoD should notify Congress that it intends to rescind the ground 
combat exclusion policy, opening all ground jobs to any person who is qualified 
to fill those positions, regardless of gender. This would open approximately 
180,000 positions to qualified women who desire to serve in combat roles.204 By 
law, DoD must notify Congress in advance of rescinding this policy. It will also 
take some time for the services to ensure that training facilities and leadership 
are ready to receive women into the training pipeline for combat positions. 
Additionally, leadership must take steps to inform and educate male-only 
combat units that qualified women warriors will soon be entering their units, 
standards will not be lowered, and denigration will not be tolerated. Recruiters 
and MEPS staff must also receive guidance on how to counsel all recruits on this 
change and utilize the capabilities and desires of all male and female recruits to 
maximize readiness. 
D. Rescind the Policy that Permits Servicewomen to Avoid their Commitments 
Due to Pregnancy 
The Department of Defense should rescind the policy that allows 
servicewomen skirt their commitment to the military due to pregnancy. It must 
also create a climate where commanders are encouraged to counsel military 
women on their responsibilities to not plan a pregnancy during deployment 
vulnerability times or when serving in jobs where pregnancy would prohibit 
them from conducting their primary duties. 
E. Eliminate Double Standards. 
All the military services should review their policies, starting with basic 
training, to eliminate double standards that favor women, demean women, or 
treat them differently than their male counterparts. For example: all basic 
training should be gender-integrated and challenging for both men and women. 
 
 203. Assignment of Army and Marine Corps Women Under the New Definition of Ground Combat: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Mil. Forces & Personnel of the H. Comm. on the House Armed Services, 
103d Cong (1994) (statement of the Honorable Edwin Dorn, Under Secretary of Defense). 
 204. Id. 
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Women’s hair should be at least cut extremely short upon entering basic 
training in all services. Uniforms should be standardized, and skirts, high heels, 
and pantyhose should be removed from the military uniform. 
F. Amend the Military Selective Service Act to Include Women 
Congress should amend the Military Selective Service Act to include 
women. Indeed, the Equal Protection Clause may compel this change if the 
ground combat exclusion policy is lifted.205 Amending the Selective Service Act 
will provide the widest pool of candidates from which to choose for all military 
roles in the case of a national emergency and will ensure that American women 
participate in the most basic obligation of citizenship. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States is engaged in a long-term Global War on Terrorism. To 
fight this war, America must field the most capable and flexible military force 
possible. Some think that military readiness and increased roles for women in 
the military are mutually exclusive objectives. On the contrary, the evidence 
indicates these objectives are mutually reinforcing. If the goal is to field the most 
capable force, a policy that excludes the majority of the population from even 
being considered to serve in over 200,000 military positions is inefficient and 
only decreases military flexibility. Like previous prohibitions against women 
flying combat aircraft or serving on combat vessels, the ground combat 
exclusion policy was shaped by antiquated views regarding the “proper” role of 
women. 
The ground combat exclusion itself suffers from obsolescence. Modern 
warfare is no longer linear; combat occurs in a 360-degree battlefield around all 
combat and combat support forces. Women soldiers are at risk of being injured, 
captured, or killed and are displaying incredible skill and courage in combat 
situations. The Army is transforming into a modular fighting system where 
restrictions on assignment of women limit flexibility. The Army is also 
increasing its end strength and continues to lower standards to fill its 
recruitment quotas. Given these realities, the military needs to recruit from one 
hundred percent of the population for positions that each is best qualified to fill. 
Common arguments against women serving in ground combat are not 
sufficient to exclude all women from being considered for combat roles. Some 
women have the physical strength to fill ground combat assignments, just as 
some men do not. Assessing recruits as individuals can provide the most 
capable and flexible fighting force. Women do not, by their mere presence, 
diminish cohesion in a warfighting unit. And the American public is willing to 
have women serve in any role in the All-Volunteer Force for which they are 
qualified. 
 
 205. In Rostker v. Goldberg, the Supreme Court side-stepped full Equal Protection analysis of the 
Military Selective Service Act’s registration provisions because, in light of the exclusion of women 
from combat, men and women were not similarly situated with respect to registration for the draft. 
453 U.S. 57, 77 (1981). See also supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
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Throughout 230 years of history and many conflicts, American women 
have shown great courage in service to their country despite restrictions in their 
military roles. Incrementally, laws and policies have changed to open more and 
more positions to women as they prove their worth and as cultural views 
evolve. The military is now at another historic crossroads: The time has come to 
rescind the obsolete and counterproductive ground combat exclusion policy. 
At the same time, a comprehensive reengineering of gender-related policy 
is essential to attain maximum combat effectiveness. Effectiveness is degraded 
when women and men are accessed, evaluated, inculcated, conditioned, trained, 
and assigned differently because of gender. In order to integrate men and 
women as equal warriors on the most effective combat team, the DoD needs to 
end some holdover policies that were founded in years when military women 
held more traditionally “female” positions. Double standards that favor or 
demean women must be identified and eliminated. A modified ethos is 
necessary where men and women serve under equal expectations, respect, and 
accountability—where both women and men place service and ultimate victory 
first and demure the notion of disparate prerogatives based on gender norms. 
“No women in combat” may be the policy recently affirmed by the 
Commander-in-Chief, but it is not the reality of the current war. The 1994 
combat exclusion policy feebly attempts to build a concrete wall between combat 
and non-combat with intent to exclude American women from ground combat. 
Yet, like previous policies and laws that tried to wall off women from air and sea 
combat, the distinction is imaginary and this policy is obsolete. Despite this 
formal exclusion, women have marched into direct fire. Fortunately, American 
women have proven they are capable of fighting in ground combat. To fight the 
long war ahead, America needs a policy that assigns both men and women to 
positions for which they are qualified—with no limiting exclusions—based on 
physical and intellectual capabilities, leadership skills, and aptitude. With a new 
Congress and Secretary of Defense, the time is ripe to abrogate this obsolete 
policy once and for all. By law, the Secretary needs only to notify Congress of 
his intent to remove this last barrier for fully utilizing our women in uniform. 
“Mr. Secretary, tear down this wall.” 
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APPENDIX A 
POSITIONS CLOSED TO WOMEN AS OF 2005206 
 
U.S. ARMY 
POSITION, WEAPON SYSTEM, AND FIELD OF SKILLS RATIONALE FOR THE APPLICABILITY 
Infantry Direct ground combat primary mission 
11A Infantry Officer Direct ground combat primary mission 
11B Infantryman Direct ground combat primary mission 
11C Indirect Fire Infantryman Direct ground combat primary mission 
11Z Infantry Senior Sergeant Direct ground combat primary mission 
Armor Direct ground combat primary mission 
12A/ B Armor Officer Direct ground combat primary mission 
12C Cavalry Officer Direct ground combat primary mission 
19D Cavalry Scout Direct ground combat primary mission 
19K M1 Abrams Armor Crewman Direct ground combat primary mission 
19Z Armor Senior Sergeant Direct ground combat primary mission 
Special Forces Direct ground combat primary mission 
18A Special Forces Officer Direct ground combat primary mission 
180A Special Forces Warrant Officer Direct ground combat primary mission 
18B Special Forces Weapons Sergeant Direct ground combat primary mission 
18C Special Forces Engineer Sergeant Direct ground combat primary mission 
18D Special Forces Medical Sergeant Direct ground combat primary mission 
18E Special Forces Communications Sergeant Direct ground combat primary mission 
18F Special Forces Asst Operations & Intel Sergeant Direct ground combat primary mission 
18Z Special Forces Senior Sergeant Direct ground combat primary mission 
Ranger Direct ground combat primary mission 
Field Artillery Collocation with direct ground combat units 
13B Cannon Crewmember Collocation with direct ground combat units 
13C Tactical Automated Fire Control Systems Specialist Collocation with direct ground combat units 
13D Field Artillery Automated Tactical Data Sys 
Specialist 
Collocation with direct ground combat units 
13E Cannon Fire Direction Specialist Collocation with direct ground combat units 
13F Fire Support Specialist Collocation with direct ground combat units 
13M Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) 
Crewmember 
Collocation with direct ground combat units 
13P MLRS Operational Fire Direction Specialist Collocation with direct ground combat units 
13R Field Artillery Firefinder Radar Operator Collocation with direct ground combat units 
Air Defense Artillery Collocation with direct ground combat units 
14B Short Range Air Defense Artillery Officer Collocation with direct ground combat units 
140B FAAD Systems Technician  Collocation with direct ground combat units 
14R Bradley Linebacker Crewmember Collocation with direct ground combat units 
14S Avenger Crewmember Collocation with direct ground combat units 
Combat Engineer Line Companies Collocation with direct ground combat units 
12B Combat Engineer Collocation with direct ground combat units 
Ground Surveillance Radar Platoons Collocation with direct ground combat units 
96R Ground Surveillance Systems Operator Collocation with direct ground combat units 
Mechanical Maintenance Collocation with direct ground combat units 
45D Self Propelled Field Artillery Turret Mechanic Collocation with direct ground combat units 
45E M1 Abrams Tank Turret Mechanic Collocation with direct ground combat units 
45N / 63N M60A1/A3 Tank Turret/ System Mechanic Collocation with direct ground combat units 
45T Bradley Fighting Vehicle System Turret Mechanic Collocation with direct ground combat units 
63A M1 Abrams Tank System Maintainer Collocation with direct ground combat units 
63D Artillery Mechanic Collocation with direct ground combat units 
63E M1 Abrams Tank System Mechanic Collocation with direct ground combat units 
 
 206. DEFENSE DEP’T ADVISORY COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE SERVS. (DACOWITS), ANNUAL REPORT 
ON STATUS OF FEMALE MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES, FY2002–05, at 2–6, 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/dacowits/docs/feb2006/StatusofWomenFinal_05.doc. 
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U.S. ARMY 
POSITION, WEAPON SYSTEM, AND FIELD OF SKILLS RATIONALE FOR THE APPLICABILITY 
63M / 63T Bradley Fighting Vehicle system Maintainer 
/ Mech 
Collocation with direct ground combat units 
63N M60A1/A3 Tank System Mechanic Collocation with direct ground combat units 
63T Bradley Fighting Vehicle System Mechanic Collocation with direct ground combat units 
 
U.S. AIR FORCE 
POSITION, WEAPON SYSTEM, AND FIELD OF SKILLS  RATIONALE FOR THE APPLICABILITY 
11SXA and 11SXB—Special Ops Rotary Wing Pilot—
restricted weapon systems MH-53 and MH-60 only Collocation with direct ground combat units 
13DX—Control and Recovery (Includes suffixes A—
Combat Rescue, and B—Special Tactics) 
Collocation with direct ground combat units 
15WX (restricted positions when serving with the 
Army)—Weather 
Collocation with direct ground combat units 
11XXU and 12XXU—Pilot and Navigator Air Liaison 
Officer Collocation with direct ground combat units 
1T2X1—Pararescue  Collocation with direct ground combat units 
1C2X1—Combat Control  Collocation with direct ground combat units 
1C4X1—Tactical Air Command And Control  Collocation with direct ground combat units 
1A1XB—Flt Engineer/Gunner MH-53, MH-60 Collocation with direct ground combat units 
1W0X1—Weather Collocation with direct ground combat units 
2E1X3—Ground Radio Comm  Collocation with direct ground combat units 
3C1X1—Radio Communications Systems Collocation with direct ground combat units 
Tactical Air Command And Control Helper Collocation with direct ground combat units 
Pararescue Helper Collocation with direct ground combat units 
 
U.S. MARINE CORPS 
POSITION, WEAPON SYSTEM, AND FIELD OF SKILLS  RATIONALE FOR THE APPLICABILITY 
0302 a Infantry Officer Direct ground combat primary mission 
0303 a light-Armored Vehicle Officer Direct ground combat primary mission 
0306 a Infantry Weapons Officer Direct ground combat primary mission 
0802 a Field Artillery Officer Direct ground combat primary mission 
1802 a Tank Officer Direct ground combat primary mission 
1803 a Assault Amphibian Vehicle Officer Direct ground combat primary mission 
0840 a Naval Surface Fire Support Planner Direct ground combat primary mission 
0845 a Naval Gunfire Spotter Direct ground combat primary mission 
0803 a Target Acquisition Officer Direct ground combat primary mission 
0311 a Rifleman Direct ground combat primary mission 
0313 a LAV Crewman Direct ground combat primary mission 
0321 a Reconnaissance Man Direct ground combat primary mission 
0331 a Machinegunner Direct ground combat primary mission 
0341 a Mortar Man Direct ground combat primary mission 
0351 a Assaultman Direct ground combat primary mission 
0352 a Anti-Tank/Assault Guided Missileman Direct ground combat primary mission 
0369 a Infantry Unit Leader Direct ground combat primary mission 
1812 a M1A1 Tank Crewman Direct ground combat primary mission 
1833 a Assault Amphibious Vehicle Crewman Direct ground combat primary mission 
0811 a Field Artillery Cannoneer Direct ground combat primary mission 
0844 a Field Artillery Fire Control Man Direct ground combat primary mission 
0861 a Fire Support Man Direct ground combat primary mission 
0842 a Field Artillery Radar Operator Direct ground combat primary mission 
0848 a Field Artillery Operations Man Direct ground combat primary mission 
0847 a Artillery Meteorological Man Direct ground combat primary mission 
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U.S. NAVY207 
POSITION, WEAPON SYSTEM, AND FIELD OF SKILLS RATIONALE FOR THE APPLICABILITY 
Special Warfare SEAL Officer and SEAL Enlisted Direct ground combat primary mission 
Enlisted Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technicians and 
Special Operations Officers who are integrated with 
Special Warfare/Special Forces Units 
Direct ground combat primary mission 
Special Warfare Combatant Craft Crewmember 
(includes Surface Warfare Officers assigned to Special 
Boat Units) 
Direct ground combat primary mission 
Special Operations Independent Duty 
Corpsman/Special Operations Technician Corpsman 
(SEAL Hospital Corpsman Navy Enlisted Code 
8491/8492) 
Direct ground combat primary mission 
Support personnel assigned to Naval Special Warfare 
Development Group (Information Systems Technician, 
Electronics Technician, Construction Mechanic - 
positions are doctrinally required to physically 
collocate and remain with direct ground combat units 
closed to women) 
Collocation with direct ground combat units 
Support personnel assigned to Joint Communications 
Unit (Information Systems Technician, Electronics 
Technician - positions are doctrinally required to 
physically collocate and remain with direct ground 
combat units closed to women) 
Collocation with direct ground combat units 
Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies (ANGLICO) 
(Surface Warfare Officer) Collocation with direct ground combat units 
Infantry Regiment and below (Medical Corps Officer; 
Chaplain Corps Officer; Religious Program Specialist 
Collocation with direct ground combat units 
Tank Battalion and below (Medical Corps Officer; 
Chaplain Corps Officer; Religious Program Specialist) Collocation with direct ground combat units 
Assault Amphibian Battalion and below (Medical 
Corps Officer; Chaplain Corps Officer; Religious 
Program Specialist; Navy Enlisted Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal Technicians and Special Operations Officers 
when assigned) 
Collocation with direct ground combat units 
Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (Medical 
Corps Officer; Chaplain Corps Officer; Religious 
Program Specialist) 
Collocation with direct ground combat units 
Combat Assault Battalion, 3rd Marine Division (MAR 
DIV) (Medical Corps Officer; Chaplain Corps Officer; 
Religious Program Specialist) 
Collocation with direct ground combat units 
Force Reconnaissance Battalion, Marine Division 
(Medical Corps Officer; Chaplain Corps Officer; 
Religious Program Specialist) 
Collocation with direct ground combat units 
Artillery Battalion and below (Medical Corps Officer; 
Chaplain Corps Officer; Religious Program Specialist) Collocation with direct ground combat units  
Combat Engineer Battalion and below (Medical Corps 
Officer, Chaplain Corps Officer; Religious Program 
Specialist) 
Collocation with direct ground combat units  
Special Amphibious Reconnaissance Independent Duty 
Corpsman (Hospital Corpsman 
Collocation with direct ground combat units  
Marine Force Reconnaissance Corpsman (Hospital 
Corpsman) 
Collocation with direct ground combat units  
Medical Field Service Technician (Hospital Corpsman) Collocation with direct ground combat units  
Submarines (SSN, SSBN, SSGN, AGSS, NR-1)  Costs of appropriate berthing and privacy 
arrangements are prohibitive 
Patrol Coastal (PC) ships (due to inadequate berthing 
and privacy requirements as well as doctrinal 
requirement to physically collocate and remain with 
direct ground combat units closed to women) 
Costs of appropriate berthing and privacy 
arrangements are prohibitive 
 
 
 207. It is important to note that, regarding positions in the listed units, the Navy skill field itself 
is not closed to women—only the performance of that skill field on the specific, closed platform. 
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APPENDIX B 
NON-U.S. EXAMPLES OF WOMEN IN COMBAT208 
WWI. The participation of Russian women in all roles including combat in 
WWI was unprecedented. At first, women served in a variety of support roles, 
some women combatants disguised themselves as men, and others were 
accepted to serve as combatants without being forced to disguise their gender. 
Command personnel frequently used high praise in describing their female 
soldiers. While men hesitated, women often volunteered for dangerous 
reconnaissance missions and in many instances were the first to rush from 
trenches during attacks. Russia’s women soldiers often proved more 
enthusiastic, better disciplined, more courageous and more self-sacrificing than 
their male compatriots. Many were even awarded high military honours like the 
St. George’s Cross for their courage.209 
By 1917, women were trained in separate all female units, both as an effort 
to use all resources against the Germans and Bolsheviks, and as an attempt to 
rally and shame the male troops into fighting. “That women could perform 
adequately in combat was demonstrated by the action of the 1st Russian 
Women’s Battalion of Death on 9 July 1917. The battalion impressed senior male 
commanders and embarrassed German troops forced to surrender to them.”210 
Russian women’s participation in WWI was a result of necessity as well as a 
political and cultural philosophy of social democracy that was emerging in 
Russia at the time, where equality and rights were granted to all. These rights 
also came with the obligation to defend the nation. 
China. In 1934, the Chinese Communist Army began the famous “Long 
March,” a 10,000-kilometer retreat following a blockade and attacks by Chiang 
Kai-Shek’s Nationalist Army. “More than 2,000 of the women who joined the 
Red Army in the 1920s and early 1930s participated in the Long March.”211 Little 
has been written about women’s participation in this treacherous journey, which 
defined the first generation of Chinese Communists. Chinese culture consists of 
a mix of philosophies on women. Traditional Confucian beliefs held women in 
an inferior position to men in society. Mao Zedong, however, adopted a 
philosophy of the People’s War, where an oppressor can only be overthrown if 
the entire population (men and women) was mobilized behind the war effort. 
 
 208. This section is not intended to be a comprehensive review of women’s roles in the military 
throughout history, but instead some examples of their participation in a variety of societies and 
conflicts in the modern era. This section is meant only to provide data points to show that, due to or 
in spite of cultural norms, women have demonstrated that they are capable of fighting fiercely in 
combat. 
 209. Laurie Stoff, They Fought For Russia: Female Soldiers of the First World War, in A SOLDIER AND 
A WOMAN: SEXUAL INTEGRATION IN THE MILITARY 66, 68–69 (Gerald J. DeGroot & Corinna Peniston-
Bird eds., Pearson Educ. Ltd. 2000). 
 210. Gerard J. DeGroot, Introduction: Arms and the Woman, in A SOLDIER AND A WOMAN, supra 
note 209, at 3, 11. 
 211. Helen Praeger Young, Women at Work: Chinese Soldiers on the Long March, 1934–1936, in A 
SOLDIER AND A WOMAN, supra note 209, at 83. 
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He successfully mobilized women in both the anti-Japanese war and the Chinese 
civil war. 
WWII. In the modern era, WWII marked the most extensive participation of 
women throughout the ranks of several countries including the U.S., but the 
roles again demonstrated the tension between necessity and cultural norms. For 
example, Britain utilized mixed-gender anti-aircraft batteries, where women 
were trained in all positions but pulling the trigger. When Britain created the 
Home Guard, “[m]en deemed unfit for regular military service (or those in 
reserved occupations) were being organized into local defence units because the 
threat of German invasion seemed real.”212 Therefore, elderly and sick men 
joined, but women were prohibited from exercising the most fundamental 
obligation of citizenship. This demonstrates a circumstance where cultural 
norms weighed stronger than maximizing all resources for national defense. 
Russia is an example where national survival and defense took precedence. 
After the German invasion of Russia in 1942, women fought in startling 
numbers in Russia in all capacities in the air and on the ground. For example, 
Russia trained three regiments of pilots: The 586th regiment of fighter pilots, the 
587th bomber pilots, and the famous 588th night bombers, “who proved so 
effective at hitting their targets that they were nicknamed by the Germans the 
night witches.”213 According to Soviet records, these women flew “a combined 
total of more than 30,000 combat sorties, produced at least 29 Heroes of the 
Soviet Union (of the 33 female aviators and 93 total women who received that 
medal) and included in their ranks at least three fighter aces.”214 Russian women 
also fought extensively in ground combat. 
Germany showed the most conservative philosophy towards the role of 
women in the military and combat. Hitler believed “Nazi women were to 
guarantee the survival of the Aryan race in the labor room, not on the 
battlefield.”215 Nonetheless, women increasingly served in combat support in 
greater numbers (over 450,000) as the war progressed. Like Britain, Germany 
trained and utilized women in antiaircraft and searchlight positions with the 
same success, but they were also prohibited from actually firing the AA guns. In 
February 1945, Hitler directed the creation of an experimental woman’s infantry 
battalion, but the war ended before they could be trained and employed.216 
Vietnam. Mao Zedong’s People’s War philosophy was passed on to the 
Vietminh when China was providing advice to them in their struggle against 
their French rulers in the 1950s. Chinese Gen. Chen Geng was the senior military 
advisor to the Vietminh. Upon appointment to this role, he analyzed the 
readiness and ability of the Vietminh to defeat the French. In his diary, he wrote 
that “he discovered that the Vietminh neglected the mobilization of women in 
its struggle against the French. Since women constituted more than half of the 
 
 212. DeGroot, Introduction, in A SOLDIER AND A WOMAN, supra note 209, at 5 (alteration added). 
 213. Campbell, supra note 54, at 319. 
 214. Reina Pennington, “Do Not Speak of the Services You Rendered”: Women Veterans of Aviation in 
the Soviet Union, in A SOLDIER AND A WOMAN, supra note 209, at 152, 153. 
 215. Campbell, supra note 54, at 313–14. 
 216. Id. at 317–18. 
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Vietnamese population, Chen believed that ignoring them meant wasting more 
than half of the human resources. He pointed this out to Vietminh leaders.”217 
Although many women joined the resistance in the French-Indochina War, 
they were fully mobilized by Ho Chi Minh in the American war in Vietnam. 
Women served in a variety of roles during the war motivated by a great sense of 
patriotism and a call to defend their homeland. Many remained as guardians of 
their villages through service in the militia and anti-aircraft defense while 
continuing to work in the production of agriculture and industry. “Over 60,000 
educated women worked as engineers, reporters, doctors and communications 
operators on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the southern battlefields. The largest 
number entered the army through the volunteer youth corps.”218 They endured 
brutal field conditions and demonstrated the ability to fight and lead in battle. 
Israel. Since the creation of the Israeli Defense Force in 1948, both women 
and men have been conscripted, but women are now obligated to serve for two 
years versus three for the men. Contrary to popular myths, women have served 
primarily in support roles in the Israeli military in past conflicts with 
neighboring countries; the lone exception was the 1948 war for independence. 
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